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Article 2

VIRTUAL TAKINGS: THE COMING FIFTH
AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO NET
NEUTRALITY REGULATION
Daniel A. Lyons*
"Net neutrality" refers to the principle that broadband providers should
not limit the content and applications available over the Internet. Long a
rallying cry of techies and academics, it has become one of the central pillars of
the Obama Administration'stelecommunications policy. The Federal Communications Commission's efforts to regulate the "onramp to the Internet" have
attracted significant attention from the telecommunications industry and the
academic community, which have debated, among other things, whether the
proposed restrictionsviolate broadbandproviders'First Amendment rights. But
there is an additionalconstitutionalimplication of net neutrality that has not
yet been sufficiently addressed in the scholarly literature: the Takings Clause.
This Article argues that under the Supreme Court's Takings Clausejurisprudence, the Commission's proposed net neutrality rules effect a permanent
physical occupation of private broadband networks and therefore take broadband providers'propertywithout just compensation. In essence, net neutrality
would grant Internet content providers a permanent virtual easement across
privately owned broadband networks to deliver content to end-users. It thus
would deprive broadband providers of the right to exclude others from their
networks-a right that the Court's takingsjurisprudencehas repeatedly dubbed
"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly char© 2011 Daniel A. Lyons. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational

purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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acterized as property."I At the very least, the Takings Clause issue raises a
serious constitutional question regarding the Commission's authority
to adopt net neutrality regulations without clear authority from Congress to do so. The Commission should therefore seek explicit congressional approval before promulgating net neutrality rules, rather
than continuing to freelance at the periphery of its regulatory
authority.
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INTRODUCTION

Born in the nether world of law review articles and academic conferences, net neutrality has quickly matured to become one of the
Obama Administration's defining telecommunications issues. The
Federal Communications Commission has proposed rules 2 to regulate
what new Chairman Julius Genachowski has described as the "on
ramp to the Internet": the privately held telecommunications networks that connect individual consumers to the Internet's public servers. 3 Termed the "Open Internet" Initiative, these proposed rules
would limit the discretion of broadband providers such as Verizon,
AT&T, and Comcast to regulate the terms of access to their networks
4
by Internet content providers such as Google and Hulu.
Proponents of net neutrality have long argued that such restrictions are necessary to prevent broadband providers from leveraging
their market power to adversely affect Internet development and
operation.5 Net neutrality opponents, however, have questioned the
practical effects of such proposals and have argued that, for the most
6
part, net neutrality seems to be a solution in search of a problem.
Opponents also recognize that billions of dollars have been invested
over the past decade to build a high-speed broadband network, and
much more is still required to achieve the Administration's goal of
ubiquitous broadband access. 7 Such investment is retarded by regulations that restrict broadband providers' ability to recover these costs
through enhanced services or tiered-access pricing. With the promulgation of the Commission's "Open Internet" notice of proposed
rulemaking8 and its follow-up notice of inquiry regarding the Frame2 See Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg.
62,638 (FCC proposed Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Net Neutrality NPRM] (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).
3 See Julius Genachowski, Conversations with FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski:
Thoughts on the October Commission Meeting & the Open Internet NPRM, OPENINTERNET.GOV (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.openinternet.gov.
4 See Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 2, at 62,645.
5 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, In Support of Network Neutrality, 3 ISJLP 185, 188-95
(2007); Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 580-90 (2007).
6 See, e.g., Wu & Yoo, supra note 5, at 580-81.
7

See, e.g., FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA 9 (2010), available at http://download.

broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf
[hereinafter CONNECrING
AMERICA] (discussing Commission's goal to provide affordable high-speed broadband
access to 100 million households by 2020).
8 See Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 2, at 62,638.
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work for Broadband Internet Service, 9 this debate has finally spilled
over from the pages of law reviews and onto the docket of the government's chief telecommunications regulator, the Federal Communications Commission.
The net neutrality debate has also at times assumed a constitutional dimension, focusing primarily upon dueling First Amendment
concerns. Net neutrality proponents highlight the right of consumers
to send and receive virtual speech free of "censorship" by broadband
providers, in the form of blocked or degraded transmission of certain
Internet applications or content.1 0 Others argue that net neutrality
would infringe upon broadband providers' own First Amendment
rights to speak and engage in editorial control of content distributed
over their networks."1 While the Supreme Court has recognized First
12
Amendment protection for network operators in similar contexts, it
is unclear how these decisions apply in the net neutrality context.
But there is an additional constitutional limitation whose import
has not been sufficiently addressed in the net neutrality literature: the
Takings Clause. The "Open Internet" Initiative would compel broadband providers to provide third parties access to their networks, and
to do so on the same terms as the broadband providers' own proprietary content. Net neutrality thus deprives broadband providers of the
right to exclude others from their networks-a right that the Court's
takings jurisprudence has repeatedly dubbed "'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property."' 13 In essence, net neutrality grants content providers a per9 See Framework for Broadband Internet Serv., 25 FCC Rcd. 7866 (June 17,
2010) [hereinafter Broadband Framework NOI] (notice of inquiry).
10 See Jack M. Balkin, Remarks at FCC Workshop on Speech, Democratic Engagement,
and the Open Internet, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 16, 2009), http://balkin.blogspot.com/

2009/12/remarks-at-fcc-workshop-on-speech.html. The parties agree on the need to
block harmful content such as obscene material and spam. The net neutrality debate
revolves around delivery of lawful content.
11 See Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality Mandates:Neutering the FirstAmendment in the
DigitalAge, 3 ISJLP 197, 203-04 (2007); Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas C. Goldstein,
Proposed "Net Neutrality" Mandates Could Be Counterproductive and Violate the FirstAmendment, FCC.Gov (Oct. 19, 2009), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view?id=7020375998.
12 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 653-68 (1994) (holding that the
First Amendment protects cable operators' right of editorial control over content
transmitted across their networks, but that statute requiring cable companies to carry

certain local broadcast channels is a content-neutral restriction that satisfies intermediate scrutiny).
13 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)); see also Nollan v.
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manent virtual easement across privately owned broadband networks
to deliver content to end-users. In other contexts, the Supreme Court
has made clear that "a 'permanent physical occupation' has occurred
[for Fifth Amendment purposes] where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro" across private property.1 4 Net neutrality proponents may be correct that " [u]nder the
First Amendment Congress can make both telephone and cable companies into common carriers who must take on all traffic" and therefore as a constitutional matter, "Congress can certainly require a
much milder non-discrimination requirement like network neutrality." 15 But "[i] t is a separate question ... whether an otherwise valid

regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be
6
paid.'
This Article argues that under the Supreme Court's Takings
Clause jurisprudence, the Commission's proposed net neutrality rules
likely effect a permanent physical occupation of private broadband
networks and therefore constitute a per se taking of broadband providers' property. Alternatively, net neutrality may constitute a regulatory taking under the Penn Central ad hoc balancing test. 17 If so, the
Commission lacks the authority to adopt its proposed regulations
because it cannot assure that just compensation will be paid to broadband providers. At the very least, the Takings Clause issue raises a
serious constitutional question regarding the Commission's authority
to adopt net neutrality regulations sua sponte, particularly when combined with potential First Amendment issues and the D.C. Circuit's
recent skepticism regarding the Commission's authority to regulate
Internet providers. Given this serious constitutional question, this
Article recommends that the Commission seek explicit congressional
authorization for its "Open Internet" Initiative rather than pursuing
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (reiterating language from Loretto and
Kaiser Aetna).
14 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832.
15 Balkin, supra note 10.
16 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425; see also United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,
74-75 (1982) ("It may be readily agreed that [the statute] is a rational exercise of
Congress' authority under Art. I ....Such agreement does not, however, obviate the
additional difficulty that arises when that power is sought to be used to defeat tradi-

tional property interests. [Congress'] power is subject to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private property without compensation.

Thus, however

'rational' the exercise of [Congress'] power may be, that inquiry is quite separate
from the question whether the enactment takes property within the prohibition of
the Fifth Amendment." (citations omitted)).
17 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978).
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net neutrality on its own initiative by reclassifying broadband Internet
service as a Title 11 telecommunications service.
I.

BROADBAND DEVELOPMENT AND THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE

Before examining the constitutional implications of the Commission's recent foray into net neutrality, it is helpful to chart a brief history of the development of the broadband network and the advent of
the net neutrality debate.
A.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996

In one sense, the origins of net neutrality concerns lie in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,18 Congress's attempt to overhaul
the telecommunications industry to meet the anticipated challenges
of the twenty-first century. 19 At the time, the wire-based telecommunications industry was divided into two discrete "monoline" segments:
wireline telephone companies, which offered voice service as a common carrier over the publicly switched telephone network under Title
II of the Communications Act of 1934,20 and cable companies, which
21
offered wire-based video service under Title VI of the Act.
Before the 1996 Act, a quarter-century of regulatory policy had
reinforced the sharp voice/video divide in the telecommunications
industry. The Commission had enforced a general ban on cross-ownership of telephone and cable networks since 1970, with limited
exceptions.2 2 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 198423
expanded and reinforced this ban by generally prohibiting common
carriers, such as the local telephone companies, from providing video
programming over their networks. 24 Similarly, most local telephone
18 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
19 See Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should Decide the
Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 383, 383-84 (2010).
20 Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-614 (2006)).
21 See id.
22 See Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for
Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21
F.C.C. 307, 328 (1970) (final report and order).
23 Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).

24 See id. § 2, 98 Stat. at 2785-86 (amending Communications Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)), repealed by
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. 3, § 302(b) (1), 110 Stat.
124; PETER W. HuBER ET AL., THE TELEcoMMUNICATIONs ACT OF 1996, at 84 (1996).
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companies had received exclusive telephone franchises from states in
exchange for rate regulation and universal service obligations, with
25
the Commission's blessing.
The 1996 Act sought to infuse the industry with competition at
every level, in part by demolishing the artificial video/voice barrier
and instilling "intermodal" competition between telephone companies and cable operators. The 1996 Act repealed the Cable Act's prohibition on the provision of video services over telephone lines. 26 As
Peter Huber notes, this provision came just in the nick of time: several
federal courts had held that this prohibition violated the First Amendment rights of telephone companies, and the issue had been argued
before the Supreme Court in December of 1995, where the general
consensus was that the Justices were likely to agree, perhaps unanimously. 27 At the same time, the 1996 Act preempted all state and

local laws that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service." 28 This provision eliminated state protection of local telephone monopolies and effectively allowed cable companies to enter
the telephone business.
At the time, however, physical network constraints made
intermodal competition seem more of a long-term aspiration than a
realistically achievable goal. In particular, local telephone networks
relied primarily upon twisted-pair copper wires. These wires were adequate for conveying voice conversations but lacked the speed and
capacity necessary to deliver consistent, high-quality video signals comparable to those of the cable company. By comparison, the coaxial
cable deployed by cable companies had somewhat higher bandwidth
than their telephone counterparts. So while technological challenges
inhibited telephone companies' proposed expansion into video service, cable companies found it easier to expand in the other direction.
By 2002, the cable industry had attracted approximately two million
customers for phone service, suggesting that the 1996 Act's dream of

25 See HUBER, supra note 24, at 86.
26 Id. at 84.
27 Id. at 84-85. The adoption of the Telecommunications Act led the Court to
dismiss the case as moot. U.S.W., Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1995),
vacated as moot, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United
States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); see HUBER,
supra note 24, at 86.
28 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006).
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intermodal competition could soon reach at least the voice segment
29
of the communications market.
B.

The Growth of Broadband

Intermodal competition was boosted by the advent of a third service that the 1996 Act treated almost as an afterthought: Internet
access. 30 Residential Internet access became commercially available in
the mid-1990s.Al End-users initially accessed the Internet through
"narrowband" dial-up connections that transferred information at relatively slow speeds. In short, a dial-up end-user would use a computer
modem to call a local telephone number controlled by an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) such as America Online (AOL). ISP equipment would then convert that analog telephone call into an Internet
connection, allowing the end-user's computer to transmit and receive
data.3 2 But as consumers became more web-savvy and demanded
more (and more intensive) Internet applications, dial-up ISPs found
themselves facing the same problem that stalled intermodal competition for video service: analog calls over twisted-pair copper wire simply
lacked the capacity to meet consumers' growing appetites for
bandwidth-intensive applications.
To satisfy this consumer demand, cable companies began to offer
broadband service over their coaxial cable lines, which were capable
of higher data transmission speeds than the legacy telephone company networks. 3 3 As cable modem service caught on, telephone com29 See History of Cable Television, NAT. CABLE & TELECOMM. ASS'N, http://
www.ncta.com/About/About/HistoryofCableTelevision.aspx (last visited Dec. 29,
2010).
30 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2
(2005) ("Having largely failed to take the Internet into consideration when enacting
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress is preparing to reenter the fray as it
begins work on its second major overhaul of the communications laws in less than a
decade." (footnote omitted)).
31 See Michael J. Santorelli, Rationalizing the Municipal Broadband Debate, 3 ISJLP
43, 51 (2007). As Santorelli notes, AOL is often credited as the first company to offer
mass-market dial-up Internet access. See id. at 51 n.32.
32 See id. at 51-52; see also Keith Evans, How Does Dial Up Work?, eHOW, http://
www.ehow.com/how-does_4570408_dial-up-work.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2010)
(describing dial-up Internet).
33 See Santorelli, supra note 31, at 53. As Santorelli explains, coaxial cable is capable of transmitting both cable television signals and broadband signals at the same
time over the same wire, by sending them at different frequencies. Equipment at the
end-user's home (i.e., a cable set-top box and a cable modem) can distinguish
between frequencies and route each signal stream to the appropriate end-user device.
Id. Because the broadband signal effectively receives its own "path" on the cable line,
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panies developed Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service as a
competing broadband platform that transmitted data more efficiently
over their copper wires. At the risk of simplification, DSL did for copper wires what cable modems did for coaxial cable: it separated information traveling over the wire into two streams, which allowed data to
move more rapidly through the network with minimal interference

34
from voice traffic.

C.

The "Open Access" Debate

The advent of broadband communication threatened to render
dial-up ISPs, such as AOL, obsolete. DSL and cable modem service
offered customers access to the Internet at much greater speeds than
dial-up ISPs could offer. Moreover, broadband Internet access was
often bundled with video or voice service, meaning customers could
simply add Internet service to their existing accounts without needing
to establish service with a separate provider.3 5 To survive, ISPs sought
to gain access on a wholesale level to the facilities that cable and telephone companies used to provide broadband service, so they could
package that high-speed transmission with their own Internet access
service and thus compete in the broadband market. 3 6 Their arguments for "open access" relied upon the regulatory uncertainty surrounding the proper classification of broadband service under the
Communications Act. 3 7

In some ways, these arguments laid the

groundwork for the current net neutrality debate.
In 1998, the Commission ruled that the transmission component
of DSL service-the carrying of Internet data signals over the telephone company's DSL lines-was a "telecommunications service"
the line can transmit significantly more data at significantly greater speeds than was

available over dial-up. Id. at 52.
34 Equipment at the telephone company office recognizes the separate digital
signal and allows it to bypass the switches that the company uses to route voice traffic.
Filters in the end-user's home similarly separate voice and data traffic and route the
appropriate signal to the appropriate device. By giving data traffic a dedicated channel on the copper wire, free of potential interference from analog voice traffic, and
allowing that data traffic to bypass the switches that route voice signals, DSL service

boosts data traffic to speeds comparable to cable modem service. See id. at 52-53.
35 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4804 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order]
(declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking).
36 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24,011, 24,016-17 (1998) (memorandum opinion and order,

and notice of proposed rulemaking).
37 See generally id. (discussing the classification of DSL services under the Communications Act).
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under Title I of the Act and, therefore, was subject to common carrier obligations. 38 The upshot of the ruling was that, while telephone
companies could sell broadband Internet access directly to consumers, they also had to make their DSL lines available as a wholesale
input to unaffiliated ISPs to bundle with their own Internet access services. 39 But the Commission refused to offer similar guidance regarding cable modem service, which left open the question whether cable
40
companies were subject to a similar "open access" requirement.
The question of whether unaffiliated ISPs should receive access
to cable networks raged for years in academic circles, Commission
proceedings, and multiple court cases. 4 1 Finally, in 2005, the
Supreme Court upheld the Commission's determination that cable
modem service was properly classified under Title I and, therefore,
was not subject to common carrier requirements. 42 The Commission
reasoned that open access requirements were unnecessary in light of
the robust market for broadband access, and could in fact prove
harmful if excessive regulation hampers future broadband deployment.43 Having received the Supreme Court's blessing, the Commis-

sion promptly reclassified DSL service as a Title I (rather than a Title
II) service 44 and explained that wireless Internet access and broadband over power lines would be similarly classified. 45 In this way, the
38

See id. at 24,030-31.

The Commission explained that high-speed Internet

access via DSL is actually two bundled services: access to the Internet, which is a
largely unregulated Title I information service, and underlying transmission of infor-

mation over the DSL line, which is a Title II common carrier service. Id.
39
40
41

See id.; Lyons, supra note 19, at 403.
See Lyons, supra note 19, at 403-04.
SeeJonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute:An Insti-

tutional Perspective on the Net NeutralityDebate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19,
25 (2009). For a more detailed discussion of the open access debate and the
problems caused by this regulatory uncertainty, see Lyons, supra note 19, at 403-04.
42 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1000 (2005) (affirming the Cable Modem Order and the Commission's conclusion

that, while cable modem service "used telecommunications" in the sense that the
transportation of information from one point to another is an essential component of

the service, this transport was only one component of integrated cable modem service
and not conceptually separate from the end-product).
43

See Cable Modem Order, supra note 35, at 4800-02.

44 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,862 (2005) (report and order, and notice of
proposed rulemaking).
45 See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5909 (2007) [hereinafter Wireless Broad-

band Order] (declaratory ruling); United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line, 21 FCC Rcd.
13,281, 13,281 (2006) (memorandum opinion and order).
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Commission hoped to "establish a consistent regulatory framework
across broadband platforms by regulating like services in [a] similar
46

manner. "

Thus freed of the requirement to sell portions of their bandwidth
at wholesale rates to competitors and assured of the Commission's
position that robust competition among providers and a light regulatory touch would maximize broadband deployment, the cable and
telephone industries invested tens of billions of dollars in the last decade, mostly (though not entirely) since the 2005 ruling, to upgrade
their networks in response to burgeoning consumer demand. 47 Specifically, both industries began upgrading their networks to use fiberoptic cable. Unlike twisted-pair copper and coaxial cables, fiber-optic
cables do not depend upon the transmission of electricity through
metal to send voice, video, or data signals. Instead, the signals are
transmitted by beams of light traveling at very high speeds through
hollow, flexible glass tubes as thin as a human hair, thousands of
which are bundled together into a typical fiber-optic line.
Fiber-optic cable held the promise of a next-generation broadband service that delivered data at speeds even greater than DSL or
cable modem service. 48 But fiber-optic cables are expensive, several
times the cost of their copper-wire and coaxial counterparts. Cable
and telephone companies were reluctant to assume such a significant,
multiyear capital improvement project unless they could be reasonably certain they could earn a return on that investment. 49 AT&T and
46 See Wireless Broadband Order, supra note 45, at 5902.
47 See Thomas W. Hazlett & Anil Caliskan, NaturalExperiments in U.S. Broadband
Regulation, 7 REv. NETWORK ECON. 460, 477 (2008) (analyzing growth in broadband
opportunities and competition following the Commission's order to lift Title It obligations on DSL service).
48 SeeJIM BALLER & CASEY LIDE, BALLER HERBST LAw GRP., CAPTURING THE PROMISE OF BROADBAND FOR NORTH CAROLINA AND AMERICA 11 (June 2008), available at

http://www.narucmeetings.org/presentations/e-NCBBReportJan08.pdf

("Of all cur-

rent technologies, the most robust is fiber optics. Hair-thin glass fiber optic cables
can carry virtually infinite amounts of digital information encoded on light beams

traveling at nearly the speed of light between lasers at the ends of the cables."), quoted
in Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REv. 871, 908 n.183
(2009).

49 As Michael Santorelli has noted, fiber-optic cable is not a new phenomenon.
The telephone companies deployed some "rings" of fiber-optic cable as early as the
1980s to carry voice calls on heavy-traffic long distance corridors. See Santorelli, supra
note 31, at 62. But the telephone companies were wary of overinvesting in fiber
beyond those corridors, in part because of the lessons of the dot-coin boom. During
the 1990s, start-up companies laid millions of miles of fiber throughout the country,
with dreams that the new network would carry a wide range of next-generation
Internet applications. When the dot-corn bubble burst, many of these companies

76
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Verizon faced the most costly upgrade projects, needing to replace
literally millions of miles of copper wire with fiber-optic cable, and
therefore looked to additional revenue streams beyond mere data
transport to support that investment. This way, telephone companies
could finally achieve Congress's dream of creating true intermodal
competition in the multichannel video market by becoming the cable
50
industry's first true wire-based competitors.
D.

Origins of Net Neutrality

As the Open Access debate played out, and it became clear that
the Commission intended to take a light regulatory touch to broadband, commentators such as Lawrence Lessig and Tim Wu grew
increasingly concerned with the possibility that broadband providers
would someday use their control of their networks to discriminate
against certain content and application providers. 5 1 While there is an
incalculable number of these providers operating on the Internet, the
broadband path from the Internet to end-user consumers must neceswent bankrupt, stranding these networks and causing what has become known as a
"fiber glut." See id. at 62-63. The telephone companies were perhaps wary of making
the same mistake and therefore invested more heavily in fiber to individual neighborhoods and homes only once it became clear that the vaunted "triple-play" of voice,
video, and Internet service would guarantee a return on this huge investment. See id.
at 63.
50 Through Project U-Verse (formerly known as Project Lightspeed), AT&T has
embarked upon a fiber-to-the-node (FITN) model that uses fiber-optic cable from
the local exchange office to neighborhood nodes, then traditional twisted-pair copper
wire from the neighborhood node to individual homes. See generally Media Kit: AT&T
U-Verse, AT&T.coM, http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=5838 (last visited Dec.
29, 2010) (describing the U-Verse service). Verizon's FiOS program is centered upon
a more ambitious, and more expensive, fiber-to-the-home (FITH) system that relies
on fiber-optic cable exclusively throughout much of the FiOS footprint. See generally
FiOS TV Features, VERIZON.COM, http://www22.verizon.com/residential/fiostv
(describing FiOS service). Both companies have heavily touted their respective video
offerings as a significant source of future revenue and an essential component of a
profitable fiber-based network. These investments differ in kind from the type of
fiber installations that brought about the "fiber glut" of the 1990s: the dot-com companies largely invested in redundant (and therefore inefficient) networks between
hubs along what they anticipated to be high-traffic corridors, without installing additional fiber from those hubs to individual neighborhoods or consumers. See
Santorelli, supra note 31, at 63.
51 See LAWRENcE LESSIG, THE FuTURE OF IDEAS 46-48, 155-76, 246-49 (2001); Tim
Wu, Network Neutrality, BroadbandDiscrimination,2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
141, 145-46, 165-68 (2003) (arguing that net neutrality is needed for innovation, and
proposing an antidiscrimination rule to achieve net neutrality by "forbid[ding] broadband operators, absent a showing of harm, from restricting what users do with their
Internet connection").
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sarily go through one of a handful of companies that operate the
nation's telecommunications networks. Lessig, Wu, and others are
concerned that, should broadband providers use this control to block
or degrade certain applications or content, it would impair the creativity and innovation in applications and content that have helped the
Internet grow so explosively. 52 Chairman Genachowski has analogized this concern as the need to keep the "onramps to the Internet
open."

53

Net neutrality opponents' response has been two-fold. First, they
argue that net neutrality seems largely to be a solution in search of a
problem. Broadband providers generally have not blocked the
Internet's "onramps" to particular applications or content.5 4 As the
Commission has noted, the broadband market is competitive, with the
overwhelming majority of American consumers having a choice of two
or more providers. 55 Any broadband provider that blocks or degrades
services that consumers want is likely to face market-based repercussions as consumers flock to their competitors (in addition to possible
legal action if the interference violates antitrust law) .56 And that competitive pressure will only grow as wireless broadband matures into a
57
legitimate third platform for broadband service.
Second, broadband providers highlight the tens of billions of dollars they have invested in building and maintaining the fiber-optic networks that make broadband Internet access possible. This is a capital
risk that unaffiliated content providers have not assumed and upon
which the broadband providers must earn a decent rate of return.
52 See LESSIG, supra note 51, at 46-48, 155-76, 246-49.
53 See Genachowski, supra note 3.
54 But see infra text accompanying notes 74-80 (discussing the Comcast and
Madison River investigations). Net neutrality opponents typically dismiss such cases
as aberrations that the Commission could, and did, handle through adjudication with-

out the need for broad-reaching network neutrality rules. Of course, the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the Commission's Comcast order calls this assumption somewhat
into question.
55 See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 23 FCC Rcd.
9615, app. B at 9677 tbl.15 (2008) (noting that ninety-nine percent of zip codes are

served by two or more high-speed Internet providers); see also CONNECTING AMERICA,
supranote 7, at 37 (noting that over eighty percent of households are in areas with at
least two, and sometimes three or more, broadband service providers).
56 See Nuechterlein, supra note 41, at 39-43.
57 See id.; see also Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless at 21-31, Preserving
the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 (FCC filed
Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Verizon Comments], available at http://allfoss.fcc.gov/
ecfs/document/view?id=7020378541 (describing competitive forces and their effect
on the industry's innovation).
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Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, and others invested this capital in part to
augment their own ability to offer consumers bandwidth-intensive
Internet applications and content of their own, most notably
enhanced video services. Should consumer demand for bandwidthconsuming applications outstrip bandwidth supply (as occurred with
dial-up), broadband providers argue that they should be able to grant
priority access to the delivery of their own content, or to third-party
providers willing to pay for priority access, so as to continue to recover
the capital they have invested in their networks. 58 Christopher Yoo
also argues that allowing service providers to choose how to manage
their bandwidth would encourage innovation in the "onramp" market
by making it economically viable for new experimental broadband
business models to challenge existing broadband providers. 59
Before proceeding further, it is important to highlight the contours of the debate. Net neutrality focuses upon the potential restrictions, if any, that broadband providers can put upon Internet content
and application providers, such as Google or Hulu. It is not concerned with the fees that broadband providers charge end-user consumers for Internet access. All parties agree that broadband providers
should be permitted to charge different prices to different end-user
consumers, depending upon how much bandwidth the consumer uses
or what speeds the consumer demands. So, while Chairman
Genachowski has repeatedly referred to net neutrality as regulating
the "onramp to the Internet," it is perhaps more accurate to describe
it as regulating the Internet's "offramp." The focus is not the flow of
information from the consumer to the Internet, but from the Internet
to the consumer.
In a sense, the ongoing debate about net neutrality is an argument about the continued vitality of the "best efforts" Internet to meet
future consumer demand. As Robert Atkinson and Philip Weiser
explain, the Internet developed as an "end-to-end" open architecture,
within which a content or application provider could offer its goods to
the public simply by placing a software program on a publicly available server. 60 This wide-open Internet was, and is, comprised of "best
58 See Christopher S. Yoo, Would MandatingBroadband Network Neutrality Help or
Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-EndDebate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 23, 67 (2004).
59 See id. at 61 ("[A]Ilowing last-mile broadband providers to differentiate their
product offerings can help prevent declining-cost industries from devolving into natu-

ral monopolies.").
60

See
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effort" networks, meaning "networks that deliver any and all digital
content based on the best guess and effort as to how to forward it
along to its final destination."6 1 Content is broken into thousands of
"packets," each of which are routed through independent network
paths to the end-user, whose computer reassembles them into the
requested content. The network provider-today's broadband access
provider-makes no quality-of-service guarantee regarding how
quickly particular content can be delivered, or even whether particular content will even arrive at its destination.
As high-bandwidth applications proliferate across the web, it is
unclear whether a "best efforts" architecture remains the ideal model.
The "best efforts" Internet evolved from a download model of data
transmission: end users downloaded data from public servers in short,
discrete bursts. But more and more activity on today's Internet is
much more interactive. 62 Applications such as two-way video communication or telemedicine 63 require real-time transmission of large
amounts of data at high speed and with low latency. 64 Such applications require a minimum level of speed and performance that "best
efforts" networks do not guarantee. Other applications, such as multichannel video service, still fit the download meme but must send a
constant stream of bandwidth-consuming data to each end-user, thus
consuming far more network capacity than earlier, more traditional
download applications entail.
When networks get congested, routers queue incoming data
packets so they can proceed in an orderly fashion and sometimes start
dropping packets randomly to ease congestion. With respect to e-mail
or webpage data, a delay in packet delivery or an occasional dropped
packet is almost imperceptible to the end-user. But similar delays with
respect to streaming video or a two-way voice application could
degrade the conversation sufficiently to render the application
useless.
61

Id.

62 See Christopher Yoo, Comments on Innovation, Investment, and the Open Internet
Workshop, OPENINTERNET.GOV (Jan. 13, 2010), http://blog.openintemet.gov/?p=255.
63 Telemedicine leverages broadband networks to allow medical care facilities to
communicate remotely with physicians in a distant community to enhance the quality
of medical care. It is most commonly used to bring high-quality medical care to rural
communities. See Mignon Clyburn, Comm'r, FCC, Broadband Adoption: Traveling
the Consumer's Last Mile, Remarks at the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies (Sept. 21, 2009), available at 2009 WL 3012591 (explaining how broadband
facilitates the use of telemedicine in rural communities).
64 SeeYoo, supra note 62. Speed refers to the amount of time it takes a packet to
travel from origin to destination. Latency refers to the amount of packet loss that
occurs while en route. Id.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:1

In these cases, broadband providers make a reasonable argument
for a "managed network" that can identify certain types of data as
more important than others and give that data priority in the event of
network congestion or some other factor rendering the simultaneous
delivery of all requested content impossible. 65 In essence, broadband
providers envision a content delivery service similar to that of the U.S.
Post Office: all content and application providers can use the network
for "first class" mail, but those companies who seek to purchase "priority mail" or "express mail" services could receive faster and higherquality delivery. 66 This is known as "tiered pricing."67
On the other hand, allowing certain content providers to pay for
high-speed access, while relegating non-payers to the network's "slow
lane," would seem to give an unfair advantage to well-capitalized,
established companies in a medium that has historically rewarded
innovation and entrepreneurship outside the mainstream. In the
words of Atkinson and Weiser, "[u]nder the terms of the current
debate, this development-of managed private Internet networks-is
either an opportunity for new innovations or a threat to the Internet's
68
open environment. In reality, however, it is both."

E.

Lurching Toward a Net Neutrality Policy

This early debate spawned a series of proposed bills on net neutrality. At one point in 2005 there were four separate net neutrality
bills in some stage of the Capitol Hill process, which would have
imposed varying levels of obligations on telecommunications network
providers. 69 But the net neutrality debate turned out to be more
smoke than fire: Congress has yet to pass legislation that would explicitly subject broadband providers to nondiscrimination obligations.
This does not mean, however, that policymnakers had turned a
deaf ear to net neutrality concerns. As part of the Commission's 2005
order reclassifying wireline broadband as a Title I service, the Commission issued a nonbinding policy statement outlining four princi65 See Verizon Comments, supra note 57, at 81-84; Yoo, supra note 58, at 67.
66 See Verizon Comments, supra note 57, at 78.
67 See id. at 56.
68 ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 60, at 4-5.
69 Several congressional committees discussed net neutrality, most notably the
Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, where, at a legislative mark-up session, Chairman Ted Stevens famously stated that the Internet is "not a
big truck" but rather "a series of tubes." Hearing on S. 2686 Communications, Consumers' Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006 Before the S. Commerce Comm., 109th
Cong. (2006) (audio recording available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/
497). Senator Stevens was widely ridiculed for these comments.
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pies that would guide its approach to the Internet. 70 Specifically, the
Commission stated the following:
[T]o ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open,
affordable, and accessible to all consumers, the Commission adopts
the following principles:
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote
the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their
choice.
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote
the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote
the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do
not harm the network.
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote
the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, appli71
cation and service providers, and content providers.
Notably, the policy statement also noted that these principles "are
subject to reasonable network management" and are in any case not
formally binding until they are adopted as part of a rulemaking proceeding. 72 In a separate statement, then-Chairman Kevin Martin
expressed his view that the increasing competition within the market
for broadband providers rendered it unnecessary to promulgate for73
mal, binding net neutrality rules.
The Commission's decision to issue its "Four Freedoms" policy
statement may have been influenced by its concurrent investigation of
blocking allegations by Madison River Communications LLC, a small
rural telephone and DSL provider.7" Vonage, a provider of Voiceover-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) service, complained that Madison River
was blocking ports that were typically used by Vonage customers to
70

See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wire-

line Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,988 (2005) (policy statement).

71

Id. (emphasis omitted).

72 Id. at 14,988 n.15.
73 See Press Release, FCC, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on Commission
Policy Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf.
74 See Madison River Commc'n, LCC & Affiliated Cos., 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (2005)
(order and consent decree).
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make VoIP telephone calls, presumably because VoIP service was com75
peting directly against the company's traditional telephone service.
Following a public uproar, Madison River agreed to a consent decree
preventing it from blocking VoIP ports or otherwise impeding its customers from using VoIP applications. 76 Although the Madison River
order was not binding law, net neutrality advocates seized upon the
order as evidence that their concerns were not unfounded.
Momentum for net neutrality reform increased with the Commission's 2008 sanction of Comcast Corporation for unreasonable network management practices. 77 Comcast experienced network
congestion in certain neighborhoods caused by bandwidth-hogging
peer-to-peer file sharing programs such as BitTorrent. To solve this
problem, Comcast secretly and selectively targeted packets stemming
from such applications and delayed or terminated these transmissions
by forging reset packets purporting to be from the requesting computer and requesting termination of the download.7 8 The Commission found that "Comcast's practices contravene industry standards
and have significantly impeded Internet users' ability to use applications and access content of their choice" in a manner that does not
constitute "reasonable network management. ' 79 The Commission was
particularly distressed by the company's deceitful behavior toward its
end-user consumers, to whom it owed a duty of clear disclosure
regarding the limitations it would impose upon the services they purchased. 80 The Commission therefore ordered Comcast to cease its
practices and instead adopt a "protocol-agnostic network management technique" with clear disclosure to consumers regarding its network management policies. 8 1 The Comcast Order marked the first
time that the Commission had enforced net neutrality-like principles
against a broadband provider; the controversy and the Commission's
response would prove to be the crystallizing event that finally brought
net neutrality to the forefront of telecommunications policy.

75

See id. at 4297.

76 See id.
77 See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028,
13,058 (2008) [hereinafter Comcast Order] (memorandum opinion and order).
78 Id. at 13,030-31.
79 Id. at 13,058.
80 See id. at 13,059.
81 Id. at 13,059-60.
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F.
1.

The Open Internet Initiative and the "Third Way"

The Open Internet Initiative

As the Comcast hearing played out, net neutrality became a hot
issue in the 2008 presidential campaign, most notably in the Democratic primary. 82 After the election, President Obama made good on
his campaign promise to "take a backseat to no one in [his] commitment to network neutrality." 83 He nominated noted network neutral84
ity enthusiast Julius Genachowski as chairman of the Commission.
Shortly thereafter, the Commission promulgated a notice of proposed
rulemaking known as the "Open Internet" Initiative, which sought, for
the first time, to create binding net neutrality rules on broadband
85
access providers.
First, the Commission proposed to codify the four freedoms listed
in the non-binding 2005 policy statement as binding rules of network
management. 86 But rather than frame them as general freedoms to
which consumers are entitled, the proposed rules would place binding obligations on broadband providers specifically. 87 Therefore,
"[s]ubject to reasonable network management," a broadband service
provider cannot prevent its users from: (1) "sending or receiving the
lawful content of the user's choice over the Internet," (2) "running
the lawful applications or using the lawful services of the user's
choice," or (3) "connecting to and using on its network the user's
choice of lawful devices that do not harm the network." 88 It also could
not (4) "deprive any of its users of the user's entitlement to competi82 Then-Senator Hillary Clinton was initially silent on the topic of net neutrality,
leading many to question whether the issue would be a priority in her administration.
In November 2007, then-Senator Obama seized upon the issue, using a speech at
Google's headquarters as a backdrop to endorse net neutrality. Placed on the defensive, Senator Clinton quickly brandished her own net neutrality credentials, leading
to the two candidates co-sponsoring legislation that would have adopted strong

restrictions on broadband providers' ability to engage in access tiering.
Nuechterlein, supra note 41, at 20 n.2.
83 Obama Unveils Innovation Agenda at Google,

ORGANIZING FOR

See

AM. (Nov. 14,

2007), http://www.barackobama.com/2007/11/14/obamaunveils_innovation_
agend.php (quoting Sen. Barack Obama).
84 See 155 CONG. REc. D300 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2009) (nomination received).
85 See Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 2, at 62,638.
86 See id. at 62,644.
87 See id. at 62,645. The proposed rules would apply to broadband network providers such as Verizon, Comcast, and others that sell Internet access to the public at
non-dial-up speeds, but not to suppliers of localized WiFi services, such as local coffee
houses, which rely upon broadband network providers to send and receive data transmission from the Internet. See id. at 62,640.
88 Id. at 62,645 (emphasis omitted).
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tion among network providers, application providers, service providers, and content providers."8 9 The Commission stated that
codification of these principles "would support our goals of protecting
consumers and encouraging innovation and investment" over the
Internet.9 0
The Commission also proposed two additional rules that were not
included in the original "Four Freedoms" policy statement. 91 The
fifth rule would state that, "[s]ubject to reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service must treat lawful content, applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory
manner."9 2 Notably, this proposed rule shifts the debate away from
the obligations that broadband providers would owe to their paying
end-user customers, which had been the focus of the "Four Freedoms"
statement and spawned the Commission's sanction of Comcast. The
Commission made clear that this fifth principle "would not prevent a
broadband Internet access service provider from charging subscribers
different prices for different services" or for tiered service at different
speeds. 93 Rather, the nondiscrimination rule would prevent broadband providers from denying access to third-party content and application providers attempting to send material to the broadband
provider's end-user. Broadband providers would also be unable to
charge such providers for "enhanced or prioritized access to the sub94
scribers of the broadband Internet access service provider.
Finally, the Commission proposed a sixth principle of "transparency" requiring that broadband providers "disclose such information concerning network management and other practices as is
reasonably required for users and content, application, and service
providers to enjoy the protections specified in this part."95 The Commission explicitly stated that this rule stems directly from its experiences with Comcast's refusal to disclose its practices to consumers
96
(and to the Commission) during the BitTorrent investigation.
But the proposed rules came with two large caveats that limit the
scope of these six principles. First, each rule would be subject to "rea89
90
91
92

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 62,646-47.
Id. at 62,646 (emphasis omitted).

93 Id.
94
95

Id.
Id. at 62,648 (emphasis omitted).

96 See id.
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The Commission refused to define

this carveback with specificity, preferring instead "to describe these
concepts at a relatively general level and leave more detailed rulings
to the adjudications of particular cases." 98 But it proposed that broadband providers generally be permitted to "reduce or mitigate the
effects of congestion or to address quality-of-service concerns . . .
[and] prevent the transfer of unlawful content [or] the unlawful
transfer of content," even if doing so would otherwise run afoul of the
six principles. 99 Of course, Comcast argued that its throttling of BitTorrent traffic was necessary to "reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion," yet the Commission rejected this argument. 10 0 The
Commission's comments suggest that this carveback should be narrow
and that the "reasonableness" of a particular network management
practice likely turns upon whether it is narrowly tailored to support
the Commission's nondiscrimination rule as closely as possible. 10 1 For
example, the Commission has rejected the blocking or degrading of
VoIP traffic to relieve congestion, unless the broadband provider puts
the same restrictions on all other services that similarly affect
10 2
bandwidth usage and have similar quality-of-service requirements.
It has also rejected the singling out of any particular content provider's traffic for blocking or deprioritization, absent some 0 evidence
3
that this particular provider's traffic was harmful or illegal1
Second, the Commission floated the possibility of an exception
for "managed or specialized services" that are provided over the same
networks as broadband access but do not traverse the public
Internet. 10 4 The Commission cites as possible examples:
telemedicine, public safety communications, distance learning, and-0 5
importantly-AT&T's U-verse Internet Protocol Television service.'
97 Id. at 62,649. The Commission has similarly subjected the rules to the needs of
law enforcement, public safety, and homeland security. See id.

98

Id.

99 Id. at 62,650 (emphasis omitted).
100 See Comcast Order, supra note 77, at 13,031-32, 13,055-56.
101 See Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 2, at 62,650.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 62,651.
105 See id. It is worth noting that AT&T's IPTV service is structurally different from
Verizon's FiOS service or video services offered by cable companies. Traditional cable
service operates on a "push" model that sends all available video feeds through shared
wires to neighborhoods, much like broadcasting. Consumers tap into that shared
feed to view particular programs. By comparison, AT&T's service operates on a
"request-send" model whereby individual users request specific programs from a central server, and only that program is sent directly to that consumer's home. Though
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The proposed rules recognize that these speed- and latency-sensitive
applications benefit from minimum performance guarantees that the
"best efforts" Internet cannot deliver. At the same time, however, it is
concerned that granting such exceptions, either by rule or by case-bycase adjudication, could lead such services to "supplant or otherwise
negatively affect the open Internet."1 0 6 The Commission thus invited
comment on this trial balloon without providing much guidance
regarding what the final scope of this exception may be, if any.
2.

The Comcast Decision

Shortly after the deadline for comments to be submitted in
response to the Open Internet Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Commission's Comcast
Order. 10 7 Without addressing the merits of Comcast's behavior or the
Commission's sanction, the court ruled that the Commission lacked
jurisdiction to regulate broadband providers' network practices. 10 8
The Commission freely acknowledged that nothing in the Communications Act gives it explicit authority to regulate broadband Internet
providers.1 0 9 Instead, the Commission relied upon Title I of the Act,
which allows the Commission to regulate activities whose regulation is
"'reasonably ancillary to the ... effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibiliies."'11

The court ruled that the Commission

failed to explain how controlling network management practices was
reasonably ancillary to the regulation of activities within the agency's
purview, such as telephone service, broadcast television, or cable ser11 2
vice."1 As a result, the court vacated the order.
U-Verse uses IP protocol logic and shares physical lines with AT&T's broadband service, it travels on a private IP network that AT&T constructed specifically for video
transport and therefore is not a broadband service. See Richard Binkley, U-Verse IPTV,
HIGH DEFINrION BLOG (Sept. 25, 2007; 7:47 PM), http://www.highdefinitionblog.
com/?pageid=286. Verizon has announced plans to shift its competing FiOS service
to an IPTV model in most areas within the next few years. See Steven Kim, Verizon
FiOS Moving Towards IPTV, ENDGADGET HD (Sept. 25, 2007), http://hd.engadget.
com/2007/09/25/verizon-fios-moving-towards-iptv/.
106 Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 2, at 62,651.
107 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
108 See id. at 644.
109 See id. at 644-645.
110 Id. at 644 (quoting Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
111 See id. at 661.
112 Id.
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The "Third Way" Proposal

Though the Comcast decision ostensibly addressed only whether a
broadband provider could throttle BitTorrent traffic, its ramifications
were far more profound. To assert its jurisdiction to adopt the "Open
Internet" Initiative, the Commission had relied upon the same Title I
argument at issue in the Comcast case-indeed, the Open Internet
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking explicitly cited the now-defunct Coincast Order as authority on the point.1 1 3 The D.C. Circuit's decision
thus became a dagger pointed at the heart of the Commission's nascent net neutrality framework.
After Comcast, most argued that net neutrality could only be
accomplished in one of two ways. 1 4 First, the Commission could wait
for Congress to pass a new statute that explicitly gives the agency
authority to regulate broadband providers. With a clear grant of statutory authority from Congress, the Commission would no longer need
to rely upon its ancillary authority under Title I to reach broadband
providers. Alternatively, the Commission could reclassify broadband
service as a Title II telecommunications service, effectively reversing
the 2002 cable modem order that gave rise to the National Cable &
Telecommunication Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services'1 5 decision and its
analogous decisions governing broadband over telephone lines, wireless spectrum, and power lines. 1 6 This reversal would subject broadband providers to the panoply of regulations designed to regulate
traditional telephone service, including the requirement under § 202
of the Act that providers not unjustly or unreasonably discriminate in
1

the provision of service.

17

Unsatisfied with the merits of these alternatives, Chairman
1 18
Genachowski announced a plan that he dubbed "The Third Way."
113 See Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 2, at 62,644 ("Consistent with the Comcast
Network Management PracticesOrder,we may exercise jurisdiction under the Act to regulate the network practices of facilities-based broadband Internet access service

providers.").
114

Technically, there could be a third option as well: identifying a fount of

authority upon which Tide I could attach that was not litigated in the Comcast case.
But given that the Commission had already made its best arguments in favor of Title I
authority and lost, this route is not promising.
115 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
116 See supra text accompanying notes 35-46.
117 See 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
118 SeeJulius Genachowski, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored BroadbandFramework,
FCC, 1 (May 6, 2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC297944Al.pdf. Surprisingly, the Third Way proposal does not discuss at all the possibility that Congress could draft a new section of the Communications Act to address
the Internet. Rather, Chairman Genachowski presents the false dichotomy of full
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Chairman Genachowski proposed that, in accordance with the second
alternative above, the Commission move quickly to reverse its earlier
orders and reclassify the transmission component of broadband
Internet service as a Tide II service. 119 This move would restore the
regulatory regime over DSL service that existed prior to the Brand X
decision, but would apply a heretofore unknown bundle of regulatory
obligations to broadband providers that were not legacy telephone
companies. At the same time, Genachowski proposed exercising the
Commission's forbearance authority120 to shield broadband providers
from some of the more onerous obligations that Title II places upon
telephone companies that would be "unnecessary and inappropriate
for broadband access service," such as the duty to interconnect with
competitors. 121 The resulting regulatory framework would place a set
of "Title I-lite" obligations upon broadband providers, including a
§ 202 obligation broad enough to encompass a net neutrality requirement. 122 In June 2010, the Commission issued a notice of inquiry and
invited comments regarding the appropriate framework for regulat123
ing broadband Internet service.
With the "Open Internet" Initiative and the Broadband Framework Notice of Inquiry, the Commission has for the first time considered imposing the binding restrictions that net neutrality proponents
have long sought: real, binding limits on the ability of broadband
providers to grant or deny third parties the right to access their networks, and on what terms. Of course, antitrust law already constrains
broadband providers' ability to leverage their control of networks to
harm competitors or otherwise seek an unfair advantage in other markets, just as it does most other commercial enterprises. 124 But otherwise, the Commission has stated repeatedly that broadband access is
not subject to common carrier regulations, notably the requirement
to provide nondiscriminatory service to all comers at just and reasonaTitle II regulation (which the Chairman admits would be inappropriate) or continued regulation under Tide I (which is effectively foreclosed by the Comeast decision).
Id. at 4. This "Third Way" is thus an alternative to two unsatisfying alternatives but
fails to consider the possibility that Congress, not the Commission, should be the
ultimate decisionmaker regarding net neutrality.
119 See id. at 5.
120 See 47 U.S.C. § 160.
121 See Genachowski, supra note 118, at 5.
122 See id.
123 See Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 9, at 7866.
124 See generally Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540
U.S. 398, 406 (2004) (finding that the 1996 Act does not exempt the telecommunications industry from prosecution under antitrust laws); Nuechterlein, supra note 41, at
34-45 (discussing antitrust solutions to the net neutrality debate).
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ble rates. Thus, broadband providers currently remain largely free to
determine which entities can use their facilities and the terms of such
use, just as any other property owner can determine the conditions of
use of its property. While competitive pressure and present network
capacities have led broadband providers largely to refrain from exercising this right of ownership, the ability to do so provided some level
of comfort as Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T spent billions of dollars
upgrading to fiber-optic cable. This investment would be recovered in
part by the sale of advanced services, such as multichannel video distribution. As demand for bandwidth grows, the ability to move or
exclude unaffiliated content helps assure that broadband providers
can continue to provide advanced services to their end-user
customers.125
The "Open Internet" Initiative and "Third Way" framework therefore severely constrict the bundle of property rights that comes with
ownership of a broadband network. By denying broadband providers
the right to exclude virtual trespassers from their networks, the proposed rules effectively grant application and content providers unfettered access to the physical wires that comprise the network. Were
this a physical easement across network providers' property, the
Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence would find little
difficulty labeling the easement a permanent physical occupation of
property by another, and thus a per se taking that requires compensation. There is no reason why the same principles should not apply to
compelled access to broadband providers' physical networks. At the
very least, the scheme interferes with broadband providers' reasonable investment-backed expectations and, therefore, warrants compensation as a regulatory taking. To explain why, one must examine the
Court's modem takings jurisprudence and how it applies to electronic
networks, a topic to which this Article now turns.
II.

NET NEUTRALITy THROUGH THE LENS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

A.

Overview of Regulatoiy Takings Jurisprudence

The Fifth Amendment concludes with the pithy restriction, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 126 The clause imposes both a substantive and a procedural hurdle on the federal government's eminent domain power: the
government can take private property only if the taking is for a "public
use" and when it does so, it must provide 'Just compensation" to the
125
126

See Verizon Comments, supra note 57, at 40-49.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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affected landowner. 127 For the past eighty-five years, the clause has
also been interpreted to place a limit on the government's power to
regulate private property. A particular regulation on the use of private property may well be within Congress's power to adopt, but if the
regulation goes "too far" it will effectively constitute a taking that
requires just compensation, even if title to the property is technically
12 8
left in the owner's hands.
The Court has struggled to determine when a regulation can go
"too far." For over three decades, Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City129 has provided the three rough guideposts of regulatory
takings jurisprudence. 130 Under this test, the Court balances (1) the
economic impact of the regulation and (2) its interference with the
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations against (3) the
nature of the government's action.1 3 ' Penn Centralis, by its terms, an
ad hoc balancing test, which offers a rough list of issues that a court
should consider in its takings calculus, but deliberately refuses to
determine how much weight each factor should receive.' 3 2 The
resulting framework is flexible enough to be adapted to a wide range
of potential regulations promulgated by the modern administrative
state, but offers maddeningly little predictability or consistency across
cases.133

To provide some modicum of certainty, subsequent case law has
identified a handful of categories of regulations that constitute per se
takings without the need to balance the three Penn Central factors.
One of these is the permanent physical invasion doctrine. In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,' 34 the Court announced that "a
permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
without regard to the public interests that it may serve."' 35 Loretto
127 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
128 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
129 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
130 See id. at 124.
131 See id.
132 See id. ("[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.").
133 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Takings Clause,
and Tensions in Property Theory, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 224 (2005) ("Penn Central
claims that all takings cases are 'ad hoc,' and it warns lawyers and judges off from
using conceptual severance and other formalistic tools to draw analogies across different classes of takings cases.").
134 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
135 Id. at 426.
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involved a New York statute requiring all landlords to allow cable companies access to their properties to provide cable services to tenants,
without charging more than a nominal fee for access.1 36 In Loretto's
case, this statute allowed the cable company to install a small metal
box on the rooftop of the building and a narrow cable down the front
of the building to the first floor.1 37 The Court held that because the
statute permitted the cable company to permanently occupy the rooftop and the side of the building without the consent of the property
owner, it constituted a permanent physical occupation of the landlord's property and, therefore, the Fifth Amendment required that
1 38
just compensation be paid.
While most commentators treat per se takings as doctrine distinct
from the Penn Centralbalancing test,' 39 the Loretto Court saw its rule as
a specific application of the more general rule. Loretto draws upon
Penn Central's suggestion that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government" rather than merely an exercise of the state's
traditional police power. 140 In essence, Loretto held that where that
physical invasion rises to the level of a permanent physical occupation
of property (by the government or by a third party), the third prong
of the balancing test weighs conclusively in the owner's favor without a
need to consider the other two factors. "[A] permanent physical
occupation is a government action of such a unique character that it is
a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily
examine."' 41 "In such a case, 'the character of the government
action' not only is an important factor in resolving whether the action
42
works a taking but also is determinative."1
Loretto singled out government-sanctioned permanent physical
invasions both under the Court's prior case law and as a matter of first
principles. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall explained that"
"[s] uch an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion
of an owner's property interests" because it "does not simply take a
single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights [but rather] chops
136 See id. at 423-24.
137 See id. at 422.
138 See id. at 438.
139 See Claeys, supra note 133, at 225 ("Many commentators portray the categorical
and balancing regulatory-takings cases as two sharply, almost hermetically-separate,
fields of takings law.").
140 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
141 Loretto, 480 U.S. at 432.
142 Id. at 426.
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through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand. 1

43

Moreover, Jus-

tice Marshall explained, "an owner suffers a special kind of injury"
from a permanent physical occupation.1 44 At a bare minimum, property law guarantees that an owner will remain "relatively undisturbed"
in possession of his or her property.1 45 A regulation that not only
ousts the owner from possession, but permits a stranger to invade and
act as the true owner "literally adds insult to injury." 146 Notably, Justice Marshall was not generally known as a proponent of either strong
individual property rights or bright-line rules; his authorship of Loretto
and his justification of the decision from first principles provide significant support for the Court's per se rule.
Loretto thus draws a constitutional distinction between compelled
physical occupation cases and more run-of-the-mill exercises of the
state's police power. Loretto takings go beyond mere "restrictions
upon an owner's use of his property"; 147 rather, as William Barr,
Henry Weissmann, and John Frantz note, "[t]he operative fact in such
cases is that the government is appropriating the use of the property
for the benefit of the public." 148 Loretto thus fits comfortably alongside the long line of so-called "utility takings" cases, which hold that
the appropriation of private property for public use requires just compensation. 149 When the government eliminates the owner's right to
exclude, the property in question ceases to be wholly private. While
the state is free to appropriate the use of property in this fashion, the
1 50
Constitution requires that compensation be paid.
B.

Net Neutrality as a Per Se Taking Under Loretto

1. Net Neutrality Effects a Permanent Physical Occupation of
Broadband Networks
Even the most straightforward telecommunications regulations
can be a study in opaque, jargon-laden decisionmaking. But once
stripped of its technical facade and reduced to more conventional
property terms, the proposed net neutrality regulations strongly sug143
144
145

Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
See id.

146

Id.

147 Id. at 441 (emphasis omitted).
148 William P. Barr et al., The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over Regulatory Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 429, 485 (2005).

149
150

See id. at 485-86.
See id.
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gest a permanent physical occupation of broadband providers' property under Loretto. Net neutrality would allow content providers such
as Google or Hulu to transmit material across privately-owned broadband networks from the Internet to individual end-users, with or without the network owner's consent.15 ' In essence, these third parties
receive an unlimited, continuous right of access to broadband providers' private property for free. This access allows them to physically
invade broadband networks with their electronic signals and permanently occupy portions of network capacity, all without having to pay
the network provider for access. The effect is to appropriate the use
of these private networks for the public's benefit, in the form of unfettered and nondiscriminatory access to the content and applications of
the consumer's choosing. As Judge Stephen F. Williams noted in a
different (but related) telecommunications takings case, "[t]he creaof another,
tion of an entitlement in some parties to use the facilities
1 52
gratis, would seem on its face to implicate Loretto."
To draw a parallel to real property law, the rights granted to content and application providers are akin to a virtual easement to traverse broadband providers' networks. This type of access right fits
comfortably within the Court's physical takings cases. Loretto quotes
approvingly Professor Frank Michelman's analysis showing that, while
regulatory takings cases are hard to classify with certainty, "[t]he one
incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation)
seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that
its agents, or the public at large, 'regularly' use, or 'permanently'
occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be
under private ownership." 153 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,154 decided five years after Loretto, the Court struggled with the
creation of an easement across a privately held beach, which would
allow members of the public to cross from one public beach to
another. 155 The Court made clear that, were such an easement to be
directly imposed upon the property owner, it would unquestionably
constitute a Loretto taking, even though it meant that different members of the public might occupy different parts of the property at any
151 See supra notes 85-92.
152 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 67 n.10 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams, J., dissenting).
153 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 n.5 (1982)
(quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967)).
154 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
155 Id. at 828.
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given time. 15 6 "' [P]ermanent physical occupation' has occurred, for
purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and
continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permit157
ted to station himself permanently upon the premises."
Thus, the net neutrality rules are not mere restrictions on an
owner's ability to use its property, but instead implicate the full bundle of rights whose intersection so troubled Justice Marshall and the
Loretto Court. In Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
PlanningAgency, 5 8s the Court explained that most regulations do not
effect a per se taking claim because they "do[ ] not give the government any right to use the property, nor [do they] dispossess the owner
or affect her right to exclude others." 159 Net neutrality, by contrast,
implicates each of these rights: like the cable access statute at issue in
Loretto, the proposed regulation "chops through the bundle [of prop160
erty rights], taking a slice of every strand."
Most obviously, broadband providers lose the right to exclude,
which "has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights."' 6' Indeed, the very

purpose of net neutrality is to deny broadband providers the right to
exclude others from their networks. As the Court has explained,
"required acquiescence is at the heart of the concept of occupa62

tion."1

Unless they exit the Internet access business, broadband

providers must allow any and all content and application providers to
traverse their networks, and cannot charge a fee for doing so. In the
Court's parlance, the rule converts content and application providers
from mere "commercial lessee[s]" into "interloper[s] with a govern63
ment license."1
156
157

See id. at 831-32.
Id. at 832. The key question in Nollan was whether the government could

impose an easement as a condition of approving the homeowners' request for a permit to condemn their one-story bungalow and build a larger home on the property.
Id. at 834. The Court held that such a condition "further[s] the end advanced as the
justification for" the condition. Id. at 837. Otherwise, the condition would effect a

taking for which just compensation is required, regardless of the fact that the government remained free to deny the building permit absent the restriction. See id. at

841-42.
158 535 U.S. 302 (2002).

159 Id. at 324 n.19.
160

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).

161

Id.

162 FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987).

163

Id. at 252-53.

VIRTUAL

2011]

TAKINGS

By surrendering permanent access to third parties, broadband
providers also lose the ability to control the use of their networks. At a
base level, a broadband provider physically cannot use for its own purposes bandwidth that has already been occupied by a third party. Nor
may it send its own signals through the network if doing so will disproportionately "degrade" third party content (for example, by adversely
rerouting third-party data packets in a way that would cause delays or
packet loss).164 Indeed, broadband providers even lose the ability to
control how third parties use the network, insofar as the rules prohibit
providers from prioritizing certain third-party packets for faster delivery. 165 As Barr, Weissmann, and Frantz summarize, the government
has appropriated the right to use broadband networks, so that all content and application providers can peddle their wares to consumers. 166 In Loretto terms, broadband providers "not only cannot
exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the
property."'

67

Finally, net neutrality infringes on the right to dispose. Again,
quoting Loretto:
[E]ven though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose
of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation
of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any
value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the
property. 168
The prohibition against charging for preferred network access limits
network providers' ability to "lease" scarce broadband for a profit, and
also limits the value of the network to prospective buyers insofar as
they are unable to use for their own purposes that portion of the network occupied by third-party content. 169
164 See supra text accompanying notes 95-96, 77-80.
165 See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
166 See Barr et al., supra note 148, at 485.
167 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982).
Depending upon the final rules governing the reasonable network management and
managed services carvebacks, this infringement on the right of use may become even
greater as the growth in demand for broadband outstrips supply. As noted above, on
a congested network without quality-of-service guarantees, broadband providers will
find it more difficult to deliver the enhanced services upon which they rely to pay
back their tremendous investment in broadband deployment and upgrades. See supra
text accompanying notes 61-64.
168 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
169 It is no answer to respond that, as long as some bandwidth is available, the
broadband provider can make use of other network capacity for its own purposes.
The cable box at issue in Loretto occupied only a few cubic feet of an otherwise large
building, and the landlord retained the full panoply of rights to the rest of the build-

96

2.
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Fifth Amendment Protection of Electronic Networks

Nor should it be relevant that the right of access at issue is a right
to access electronic networks rather than to real property. As an initial matter, the Loretto rule has never been limited to physical occupation of real property. The D.C. Circuit has addressed this issue at
length in Nixon v. United States,17 0 a case involving a per se taking of
President Nixon's private papers by the National Archives. 17' The
court held that "[o]ne may be just as permanently and completely
dispossessed of personal property as of real property" 1 72 and stated
that the Court has repeatedly noted in dicta that per se physical taking
1 73
of personal property is possible.

Indeed, the Loretto Court itself considered the possibility that its
rule could cover access to electronic networks. 17 4 As Justice Black175
mun's dissent explains, Loretto's attorney asserted at oral argument
that it should not matter whether the cable line in question was
owned by the cable company or the landlord, because the cable company's invasion of the line by electronic signals would still constitute a
permanent physical occupation of private property.17 6 Justice Black' 77
mun agreed that the majority's opinion, when "[l]iterally read,'
must include compelled access to electronic networks: "[s] o long as
Teleprompter continuously passed its electronic signal through the
cable . . .a 'physical touching' by a stranger[ I was satisfied and that
1 78
§ 828 therefore worked a taking."

In the network access context, the Eleventh Circuit has found
that a statute requiring utility companies to allow cable companies to
attach wires to their network of utility poles constitutes a per se physiing. Id. at 438 n.16. The Court found this fact irrelevant: "[W]hether the installation
is a taking does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than
a breadbox." Id. More generally, as the D.C. Circuit has explained, "[t]he retention
of some access rights by the former owner of property does not preclude the finding
of a per se taking." Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
170 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
171 See id. at 1284-85.
172 Id. at 1285.
173 See id. (citing United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989)) (discussing per se takings of "real or personal property"); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427
n.5 (discussing Michelman's conception that government may trigger a taking by
.regularly us[ing] or permanently occupy[ing], space or a thing" (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Michelman, supra note 153, at 1184)).
174 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175 See id. at 450 n.8.
176 See id.
177 See id. at 450.
178 Id.
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cal taking of utility property.1 79 Admittedly, the physical configurations of the two takings are different: pole attachment involves wires
occupying space on a network of poles, while net neutrality involves
data streams occupying space inside a network of wires. But the legal
issues are identical. Both laws require network owners to dedicate a
portion of available capacity to third-party use for the purpose of
enhancing the telecommunications industry.
Moreover, as a factual matter, the transmission of content over
broadband networks is not some metaphysical act.' 8 0 It takes place in
a real physical space-the fiber-optic cables and copper wires that
comprise the broadband network, which are mounted in aboveground or underground easements across real property.' 8 ' Transmission of Internet content primarily involves the movement of electrons,
which are physical particles that occupy rivalrous limited space on
those lines, en route from the Internet to the end-user consumer.
While electrons are invisible to the naked eye and travel very quickly
within a sheathed wire, the physical act of transmission is nothing
more than a microscopic version of vehicles traveling along a high182
way-or pedestrians traversing an easement.
Some courts have suggested that the physical takings doctrine
should apply to electronic networks in the context of cable must-carry
rules. The 1992 Cable Act gave certain broadcasters the right to com179 See Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (1lth Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court considered a similar takings claim under an earlier version of the
statute, which had regulated pole attachment rates but did not make such attachment
compulsory. See FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 248 (1987). The FloridaPower
Court found no per se physical taking because, at the time, attachment to utility poles
was not mandated by the Act. See id. at 251-52. But it did not even discuss the possibility that a per se taking claim would not lie because the property at issue was poles
(which typically exist on an easement over real property owned by another) rather
than real property. Id.
180 Cf Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 67 n.10 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams, J., dissenting) ("The [National Association of Broadcasters] responds that
Loretto is limited to 'physical' occupations of 'real property.' But the insertion of local
stations' programs into a cable operator's line-up presumably is not a metaphysical
act, and presumably takes place on real property." (citation omitted)), vacated, 512
U.S. 622 (1994).
181 See id.; see also supra Parts I.C-I.D (discussing the Penn Centraltest).
182 Moreover, it is worth noting that several courts have found takings where thirdparty interference with an owner's property rights falls short of actual placement of
physical objects on the owner's property. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 261-62 (1946) (holding regular low-level flyovers by military aircraft as takings),
cited with approval in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430; Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,
233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914) (finding smoke and gases from nearby tunnel constructed
under act of Congress to be a taking).
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pel cable companies to carry their stations on cable networks. 18 3 The
cable industry fought an unsuccessful battle to oppose the requirement, primarily on First Amendment grounds. 18 4 Along the way, however, the judiciary hinted that a Fifth Amendment claim might have
gained some traction. Dissenting from the three-judge panel that
denied the cable industry's challenge, Judge Stephen Williams
explained that a law creating an "entitlement in some parties to use
85
the facilities of another" seems to invite a challenge under Loretto.
In the process, he swept aside the broadcast industry's counterargument that Loretto should be "limited to 'physical' occupations of 'real
property."1 86 Later, in TurnerBroadcastingSystems, Inc. v. FCC ( Turner
]),187 four Justices recognized that a common carriage obligation
placed on some of a cable system's channels would raise a Takings
Clause question even though the question was not squarely presented
18 8
before that Court.
Laurence Tribe expanded upon this theme eight years later,
when arguing against a proposal that cable companies be forced to
carry digital broadcast signals. 189 The shift from analog to digital television meant that broadcasters could now send multiple video feeds
instead of just one signal over the same amount of bandwidth. The
Commission opened a proceeding in 2002 to consider whether cable
companies should be required to carry these digital feeds on their
systems, as the 1992 Cable Act required for analog feeds. Tribe
argued that by forcing cable companies to allow broadcasters exclusive use of channels on the cable system, the agency would deprive
those cable companies of the right to exclude and would effectively
condemn a portion of the cable network under Loretto.190
Notably, Tribe argued that
183 See 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2006).
184 See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
185 Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 67 n.10 (Williams, J., dissenting).
186 Id.
187 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
188 See id. at 684 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Congress might also conceivably obligate cable operators to act as common carriers for
some of their channels, with those channels being open to all through some sort of
lottery system or time-sharing arrangement. Setting aside any possible Takings Clause
issues, it stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone companies
operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of cable companies ....").
189 See Comments of Laurence H. Tribe, Why the Commission Should Not Adopt
a Broad View of the "Primary Video" Carriage Obligation (FCC filed July 9, 2002)
(arguing that the digital broadcast signals at issue differ from the analog signals at
issue in the Turner decisions).
190 Id. at 13-14.
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[t] here would be no question that a compensable taking of private
property for public use had occurred if the government decreed
that cable operators had to turn over their entire channel capacity
to broadcasters, even if the cable operators retained title to and
have possession of the real and personal property necessary to provide programming to the system's subscribers over those
channels.191
The constitutional principle is the same, he argued, "whether the
transfer is accomplished wholesale or piece by piece. There is no constitutional exception that allows the government to avoid the Takings
19 2
Clause by taking one strand of property at a time."
But Tribe's parade-of-horribles hypothetical almost precisely
states the Commission's plans with respect to net neutrality. The proposed rules could effectively turn over the entire capacity of the
broadband network to content and application providers if demand
for third-party content outstripped available bandwidth. Broadband
providers would retain bare possession of their network facilities, but
would be able to use those facilities to transmit content only as
bandwidth permits. Moreover, their use of their own network would
be subject to duties not to interfere with consumer choice and not to
block or degrade other content and applications, which puts them at
a disadvantage in the market for content and applications, since their
competitors would labor under no such restrictions. In Tribe's words,
there should be "no question" that a compensable taking of private
193
property for public use has occurred.
3.

The Cablevision Decision

Yet some courts have rejected the extension of the physical takings doctrine to the context of occupation of electronic networks. In
mid-2009, Cablevision raised a belated Takings Clause challenge to
the analog must-carry statute adjudicated in the Turner cases in the
context of a Commission order requiring it to carry a Long Island
station on its networks. 19 4 This argument had previously garnered
some support from FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth: "It is
191 Id. at 14-15 ("[W] hen the Government has condemned business property with
the intention of carrying on the business, as where public-utility property has been
taken over for continued operation by a governmental authority .... [T]he taker
acquires going-concern value [and] it must pay for it." (quoting Kimball Laundry Co.
v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 12 (1949))).
192 Id. at 15. Although the Commission did not address the Takings Clause argument at length, it ultimately decided against imposing digital must-carry obligations.
193 Id. at 14.
194 See Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2009).
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not unreasonable to argue that when a broadcast station's signal is
mandatorily carried over a cable system, that carriage constitutes a
permanent, physical occupation of the cable operator's private property-and thus a per se taking of that property." 195 Here, the agency's
decision to avoid any substantive discussion of Cablevision's takings
claim pays silent tribute to the strength of the claim. Yet the Second
Circuit rejected Cablevision's argument, holding tersely that mustcarry does not require any installation of broadcasting equipment on
Cablevision's facilities and that the transmission of data over cable
bandwidth does not involve a physical occupation of Cablevision property under Loretto.19 6
The Cablevision decision demonstrates the uncertainty surrounding the extension of "terrestrial" concepts to electronic networks.
Lurking behind the text of the decision is an abstract notion that electronic networks are somehow "different" than other forms of property
and, therefore, different rules should apply. This implicit conclusion
is neither sustained nor sustainable. In reality, broadband wires are
not black boxes beyond the reach of constitutional protection, and
data transmission is not an indecipherable metaphysical process.
While Loretto undoubtedly described its ruling as "narrow,"'1 7 later
courts have extended its holding to reach easements across real property, attachment to utility poles, and possession of purely personal
property.' 9 8 Other doctrines have long found virtual access to networks a constitutional concern and have adapted "real-world" doctrines to fit network access issues.' 9 9 Broadband providers have the
same property rights in their networks as other owners have in more
conventional property, and should receive the same level of protec195 WXTV License P'ship G.P., 15 FCC Rcd. 3308, 3320 (2000) (separate concurring statement of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth).
196 See Cablevision, 570 F.3d at 98; see also Qwest Corp. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl.
672, 673 (2001) (denying Loretto claim stemming from statute mandating that local
phone company grant competitor access to its telephone network facilities).
197 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
198 See supra text accompanying notes 154-157, 170-173, 179.
199 See, e.g., Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (adopting modified O'Brien test, see
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), under First Amendment to determine constitutionality of compelled speech over cable networks); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not turn
on whether government physically penetrated area occupied by petitioner and highlighting a petitioner's expectation of privacy and the norm that the telephone is a
medium of private communication); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550
(E.D. Va. 1998) (same); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (applying trespass law to "hacking" claim involving unauthorized use of electronic network).
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C. Net Neutrality as a Regulatory Taking Under Penn Central
A regulatory takings claim that does not satisfy the Loretto test or
another of the Court's per se takings doctrines is typically subjected to
the Penn Centralad hoc balancing test mentioned above. 20 0 If broadband providers were to lose their claim that net neutrality effects a
Loretto taking, they may nonetheless assert a claim under Penn Central
As discussed above, this ad hoc test balances three factors: the owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations, the economic impact of
the regulation, and the nature of the government's action. 20 1 Regulations that merely "adjust[ ] the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good" 202 are likely to be upheld. Moreover,

because " [ g] overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law,"20 3 the doctrine typically gives wide

latitude to regulators seeking only to regulate one's use of property.
But "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government," even if short of the Loretto per se standard, particularly where
the economic impact and interference with investment-backed expec20
tations are great.

4

1. Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations
Broadband providers are likely to assert that net neutrality unduly
interferes with their reasonable investment-backed expectations with
regard to future broadband service. As noted in subpart I.C, the Commission ended the "Open Access" debate by labeling broadband service as a Title I information service free of nondiscrimination and
other common carrier obligations that accompany more heavily regulated telecommunications services. 20 5 The end of this regulatory
uncertainty led to an explosion in investment in fiber-optic cable and
other network improvements, investment that providers hoped to
recover through not only the sale of faster Internet service, but also
200 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); supra
text accompanying notes 129-133.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 129-133.
202 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
203 Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
204 Id.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
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enhanced services such as video service that faster broadband speeds
made possible. 20 6 Net neutrality unreasonably interferes with these
expectations of future revenue streams-expectations backed by literally billions of dollars of infrastructure investment. Broadband providers have a vested interest in their ability to block or degrade content
and applications to shield their present, and future, enhanced services
from broadband congestion. Interference with these expectations,
they would argue, should weigh heavily in their favor in the Penn Central calculus.

While this argument is strong, 20 7 broadband providers face a significant hurdle. As many have noted, "[d]oing business in a highly
regulated field raises the bar" for showing that any investment-backed
expectations were reasonable. 20 8 As the Court has explained, "those
who do business in [a] regulated field cannot object if the legislative
scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legis20
lative end."

9

Although broadband service is only lightly regulated under Title I
of the Communications Act, broadband providers are primarily either
telephone companies subject to Tide II or cable providers subject to
Tide VI (or both), and are therefore readily familiar with the realities
of doing business as a regulated industry.2 10 Moreover, broadband
providers have been on notice for years of the possibility of being subjected to future net neutrality regulation. Not only have a flurry of
proposals reached committees in Congress, but the Commission
explicitly issued its four freedoms policy statement in 2005.211 While

the policy statement was non-binding, its unanimous approval and
explicit language regarding future rulemaking proceedings suggested
strongly that some form of net neutrality lay in the industry's
future. 2 12 The Comcast Order and the Obama campaign's net neu206 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
207 The billions invested in infrastructure and the guarantees proffered by Brand X

and Commission precedent set broadband providers apart from most claims of investment-backed expectations. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
208 Nissa Laughner &Justin Brown, Cable Operators' Fifth Amendment Claims Applied
to Digital Must-Cany, 58

FED.

COMM. L.J. 281, 305 (2006).

209 Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (quoting FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91
(1958)); see also Franklin Mem'l Hosp. v. Harvey, 575 F.3d 121, 128 (1st Cir. 2009)
("[Franklin Memorial Hospital's] investment-backed expectations are tempered by
the fact that it operates in the highly regulated hospital industry.").

210 See supra Part I.A.
211 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986, 14,988 (2005).

212 See id.
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trality platform dispelled any lingering doubts as to the ultimate destination of Internet policy. Therefore, while fiber-optic upgrades were
implemented at a time of relatively light regulation, any expectation
by shareholders that Internet access would remain unregulated for
the foreseeable future would have been unreasonable, or at least a
judge could reasonably so find.
2.

Economic Impact

While the investment-backed expectations inquiry examines the
loss of future earning potential, the economic impact prong asks a
court to examine the effect of the regulation on the present value of
the property. Economic impact is rarely dispositive, 213 but a greater
showing of economic impact can lead to a lesser showing on the other
two factors.
In this case, it is difficult to determine, ex ante, what the economic impact of net neutrality will be on broadband providers' current use. Broadband providers are not currently engaged in blocking,
traffic throttling, and other behavior that the net neutrality rules
would forbid. Nor, for the most part, are they offering tiered service
to content and application providers willing to pay for quality of service guarantees. 214 The lack of such behavior suggests that the ability
to engage in such practices is not essential to maintenance of present
operations.
One can question whether the Supreme Court has charted the
correct course in choosing to ignore the regulation's effect on potential future markets. In copyright law, for example, owners can claim
infringement based not only on lost sales in existing markets for the
work at issue, but also based on interference with the rights holder's
ability to exploit future markets that it has not yet entered. 2 15 But
under existing Court precedent, the economic impact is small. The
net neutrality rules impose primarily opportunity costs, in the sense of
the lost value of the option to engage in such behavior if necessary.
But the value of such an option is inherently speculative, and the loss
of this option has little impact on the industry's current economics.
Therefore, it is likely that this factor will not weigh strongly in the
broadband providers' favor.
213 The Court famously sustained zoning ordinances against a takings challenge
despite the fact that the regulation caused a seventy-five percent reduction in property value. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
214 See, e.g., Verizon Comments, supra note 56, at 32-33.
215 See Campell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-91 (1994).
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Character of the Government Action

This prong examines the motives behind the government's
action and the extent to which it interferes with the owner's preexisting property rights. 2 16 In this case, these factors tug in opposite directions. The government is not merely "acting in an enterprise
capacity" for its own benefit.2 17 On the one hand, the Commission
has promulgated these rules to benefit public welfare through assurances of an open Internet. 2 18 Rightly or not, the Commission recognizes broadband providers as bottlenecks in the broadband economy
and has determined that it is in the public interest to guard innova219
tion and creativity from potential abuse of that bottleneck position.
On the other hand, the government's chosen method of regulating for the public interest involves highly invasive inroads into the private property rights of network providers. As noted above, the net
neutrality rules substantially interfere with broadband providers' traditional rights to exclude from use and dispose of property. The providers' takings claim is similar to the claim presented in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States,2 20 where the government imposed a navigational servitude on a private marina for the public interest. 22 1 The property
owner purchased a private pond in Hawaii and, with the approval of
the Army Corps of Engineers, dredged the pond and converted it into
a marina. 22 2 As a final step, the owner cut a channel to connect his
marina to a nearby bay. Once it did so, however, the government
claimed that the marina constituted "navigable waters" and therefore
imposed a navigational servitude on the marina to permit access to
the public. 223 The Court held that the government had authority to
impose the servitude-the equivalent of an easement-on the prop224
erty, but that doing so deprived the owner of the right to exclude.
225
For that taking, the Court awarded just compensation.
One can debate whether Kaiser Aetna is better classified as a
Loretto case or a Penn Central case. Loretto affirmatively disavows the
placement of KaiserAetna within its per se rule; because the servitude
is in the nature of an easement, the Court explained, people come
216 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
217 Id. at 135.
218 See Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 2, at 62,639.
219 See id. at 62,641.
220 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
221 Id. at 175.
222 Id. at 165, 167.
223 Id. at 169.
224 See id. at 178.
225 See id. at 178, 180.
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and go as they please. 22 6 Thus, while there is a physical invasion of
the marina by the public generally, there is no permanent physical
occupation. Nollan, however, seems to eschew this logic, asserting
unequivocally that the imposition of an easement on real property
constitutes a per se taking, regardless of the fact that no individual
22 7
user would maintain a permanent position on the easement.
If, after Nollan, Kaiser Aetna is better classified as a Loretto case,
then the parallels between this case and Kaiser Aetna strengthen the
broadband providers' per se physical appropriation claim. If, however, KaiserAetna properly belongs with run-of-the-mill regulatory takings cases under Penn Central, then it helps weigh the "nature of the
government action" factor in the owners' favor by showing how significantly the regulation would invade private property interests.
Given the ad hoc nature of the Penn Centraltest, it is always difficult to predict with certainty how a court will determine any given
regulatory takings case. But given the lack of significant present economic impact and the seemingly strong public interest served by net
neutrality regulation, broadband providers likely face an uphill battle
to convince a judge that the rules constitute a typical regulatory taking. The physical appropriation claim is the better of the two arguments broadband providers can make to try to preserve their property
rights from Commission appropriation.
D. Distinguishing Common Carriageand Public Accommodations
Proponents may argue that the proposed net neutrality rules are
simply a particular species of common carriage or public accommodations laws, which generally withstand Fifth Amendment scrutiny. The
Court has explained:
Where "permanent physical occupation" of land is concerned,
we have refused to allow the government to decree it anew (without
compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted "public interests" involved-though we assuredly would permit the government
to assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation
228
upon the landowner's title.

In other words, a regulatory takings claim would not lie if the
restriction that the government seeks to impose stems from background limits that the common law traditionally placed upon prop226

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).

227 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
228 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992) (internal citation
omitted) (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426).
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erty.229 No taking can occur in such a case because the law has not
"taken" anything from the landowner. Rather, if the common law
never recognized the right at issue, then it was never the owner's to
230
begin with.
But upon closer examination, this defense collapses. To avail
itself of this safe harbor, the Commission must show that the "law or
decree ...

do[es] no more than duplicate the result that could have

been achieved in the courts" 2 31 under a common law property claim,
or otherwise make explicit a limitation implied in the owner's title by
"existing rules or understandings." 23 2 In this case, the net neutrality
restrictions go far beyond whatever limitations common carriage or
public accommodations norms placed upon network owners at common law. Because net neutrality does more than simply codify an
existing rule or understanding of the common law, its enactment by
reclassification would effect a taking.
1. Common Carriage
Common carriage is a slippery term, The Communications Act
defines a "common carrier" somewhat circularly as "any person
engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio." 233 But, perhaps more helpfully, it also
notes that "[a] telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in
providing telecommunications services."234 As noted above, the Commission has classified broadband service as an "information service"
rather than a "telecommunications service,"235 meaning that it is not
currently subject to the restrictions that the Communications Act
23 6
places on common carriers.
Ostensibly, the purpose of reclassifying broadband Internet service under Title II would be to label such providers as telecommunica229
230

See id.
See id.

231 Id. at 1029.
232 Id. at 1030.
233
234

47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2006).
Id. § 153(44).

235 See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853 (2005); Cable
Modem Order, supra note 35, at 4798.
236 Cf FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 705 (1979) (vacating Commission regulation that would subject non-common-carrier cable companies to common
carrier-like restrictions under Tide I).
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tions "common carriers" under the statute. And the Commission may
well have authority to enact this reclassification, but it would effectively burden broadband providers with statutory common carrier
obligations that, according to the Act, are not currently binding upon
them. As a result, this reclassification would do more than simply
make explicit a limitation implied by "existing rules or understandings"; 23 7 it would take away broadband providers' existing rights,
thereby requiring just compensation.
The Commission fares no better with the common law. In
NationalAss'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC,238 the D.C. Cir-

cuit struggled with the "long and complicated history" of the "common law definition of common carrier," as it would apply to the
telecommunications industry.23 9 The NARUC court explained:
Originally, the doctrine was used to impose a greater standard of
care upon carriers who held themselves out as offering to serve the
public in general. The rationale was that by holding themselves out
to the public at large, otherwise private carriers took on a quasipublic character. This character, coupled with the lack of control
exercised by shippers or travellers over the safety of their carriage,
was seen to justify imposing upon the carrier the status of an
240

insurer.

NARUC in turn referred back to the seminal 1876 decision Munn
v. Illinois,241 in which the Supreme Court sustained common carrier

regulation of a grain elevator against a challenge that the law effected
a deprivation of property without due process. 242 Munn found that
common carrier restrictions were appropriate when the business in
question is "affected with a public interest," 243 a phrase coined two
centuries before by Sir Matthew Hale, then-Lord Chief Justice of the
King's Bench. 244 Munn discussed at length the types of industries that
Hale classified in this category, such as ferries, 24 5 wharves, 246 and
237

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.

238 NARUC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
239 See id. at 640.
240 Id.
241 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
242 See id. at 119-20. Munn and other cases in this line predated the modem
incorporation doctrine. Though the constitutional claim is different, these cases can

be thought of as nineteenth-century analogues to modem takings doctrine. See
Daniel A. Lyons, Public Use, Public Choice, and the Urban Growth Machine: Competing Political Economies of Takings Law, 42 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 265, 273-74 (2009).
243 See Munn, 94 U.S. at 126, 127, 129, 130.
244 See Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43
HARV. L. REv. 759, 759 (1930), cited in NARUC, 525 F.2d at 640 n.54.

245

See Munn, 94 U.S. at 126.
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warehouses. 247 In each case, Lord Hale described the industry in
question as either operating pursuant to a franchise or charter from
the king, or otherwise possessing monopoly power over the public. In
such cases, Munn explained, private property is dedicated to a public
248
use to such a degree as to justify public regulation.
The NARUC court pulled these and other strands of common law
common carriage into a two-part test.249 As interpreted by subsequent
courts and Commission decisions, this test finds a business to be a
common carrier if (1) "it will 'make capacity available to the public
Thus, as to ferries, Lord Hale says... the king has "a right of franchise
or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry for all passengers,
without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from the king. He may
make a ferry for his own use or the use of his family, but not for the common
use of all the king's subjects passing that way; because it doth in consequence tend to a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest
and use ...."
Id. (quoting LoRD MATTHEW HALE, DEJURE MArS, reprinted in COLLECTION OF TRAc'rs
RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 72 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1982)).
246 See id. at 150.
A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port or town, set up a
wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can agree...
for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to do, viz., makes the most of
his own.... If the king or subject have a public wharf, unto which all persons
that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for the
purpose, because they are the wharves only licensed by the king, .

.

. or

because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a port is
newly erected, in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive
duties ....

Id. (second, third, fourth alteration in original) (quoting LORD MATTHEW HALE,
PoRTIBus MARis, reprinted in COLLECTION OF TRACTs RELATIVE TO THE LAW
ENGLAND, supra note 244, at 72).
247 See id. at 127-28.
There is no doubt that the general principle is favored, both in law and
justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases upon his own property,
or the use of it; but if for a particular purpose the public have a right to
resort to his premises and make use of them, and he have a monopoly in
them for that purpose, if he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must,
as an equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on reasonable terms. The
question then is, whether, circumstanced as this company is, by the combination of the warehousing act with the act by which they were originally constituted, and with the actually existing state of things in the port of London,
whereby they alone have the warehousing of these wines, they be not,
according to the doctrine of Lord Hale, obliged to limit themselves to a
reasonable compensation for such warehousing.
Id. (quoting Aldnutt v. Inglis, 12 East 527, 537).
248 See id. at 130.
249 See NARUC, 525 F.2d at 642.
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indifferently"' or if (2) "'the public interest requires common carrier
25 0
operation of the proposed facility.' ,
The first prong focuses upon whether the business "'undertakes
to carry for all people indifferently.'" 251 "[A] carrier will not be a
common carrier where its practice is to make individualized decisions,
in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal."25 2 The second focuses primarily upon market dominance: "In ascertaining the
public interest, the focus of our inquiry here is whether the license
applicant has sufficient market power to warrant regulatory treatment
as a common carrier." 25 3 This disjunctive test thus captures the broad
range of industries traditionally considered common carriers. Utilities such as electricity and traditional telephony are common carriers
by virtue of their market power, while industries such as trucking and
lodging become common carriers, despite a lack of market power,
due to the voluntary decision to hold themselves out to serve the public indiscriminately.
Broadband providers satisfy neither prong of the disjunctive
NARUC test. First, as regards content and application providers,
broadband providers explicitly have not held themselves out to carry
for all entities indiscriminately. 25 4 Rather, they reserved the right to
make, and in many cases actually have made, "individualized deci'2 55
sions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal.
Indeed, Verizon, AT&T, and the rest of the industry have opposed the
"Open Internet" Initiative precisely because it would deny them the
ability to negotiate individualized access agreements that they wish to
reach with content and application providers. Second, the Commission has repeatedly found that the marketplace for broadband ser25 6
vices is competitive, thus foreclosing a finding of market power.
250 V.I. Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 921, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Cable &
Wireless, PLC, 12 FCC Rcd. 8,516, 8,522 (1997) (cable landing license)).
251 NARUC, 525 F.2d at 641 (quoting, inter alia, Semon v. Royal Idemn. Co., 279
F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1960)).
252 Id.
253 AT&T Submarine Sys., Inc., 13 FCC Rcd. 21,585, 21,589 (1998) (memorandum
opinion and order).
254 See NARUC, 525 F.2d at 641.
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an
Information Service, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,281, 13,281 (2006) (memorandum opinion and
order); Wireline Broadband Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,877-78 (2005) (report
and order and notice of proposed rulemaking); Petition for Forebearance of the Verizon Telephone Companies Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), 19 FCC Rcd. 21,496,
21,504 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order); Triennial Review Order, 18 FCC
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The Commission has found that over ninety-nine percent of zip codes
have multiple choices for high-speed Internet access, 257 and as wireless broadband matures, competition in the industry will only
increase. Because broadband service does not satisfy either prong of
the NARUC test, it does not fit the traditional common law definition
of common carriage.
Susan Crawford has recently suggested that this focus on market
power represents a flawed interpretation of past precedent.2 58 She
argues that market power is only a recent yardstick for common carriage and is at odds with the history of common carriage legislation. 259
Crawford would substitute in its place a more amorphous test that
focuses upon whether the industry in question has a "special relationship" with the state, in the sense that their services are "fundamental
to a successful polity." 260 But this proposed definition provides no
more clarity than Lord Hale's original formulation that a business be
"affected by the public interest."2 61 As Crawford candidly notes, it is
difficult to determine what the "principled basis" for this special relationship is in a way that would distinguish common carriers from prov262
iders of other basic societal staples such as "flour and salt."
Moreover, this formulation downplays the obvious fact that concerns
about market power have historically animated many decisions in this
area, from Munn forward. 263 The Communications Act is itself
modeled upon the Interstate Commerce Act, which imposed common
carrier duties on railroads explicitly because of concerns about market
Rcd. 16,978, 17,141-42 (2003) (report and order and order on remand and further
notice of proposed rulemaking).
257 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 23 FCC Rcd. 9,615, 9,677, app. B at 9677 tbl.15 (2008) (fifth report).
258 See Crawford, supra note 48, at 876 ("Market power isnot the reason that this
non-discrimination obligation has been imposed on basic communications networks
259 See id. at 880-82; see also id. at 883-84 ("There appears to be only a weak correlation between market power or natural monopoly and the historical imposition of
non-discrimination obligations.").
260 Id. at 884.
261 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
262 Crawford, supra note 48, at 884.
263 See Henry H. Perritt,Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure,30 WAKE
FORES L. REv. 51, 61 (1995) (noting that common law common carriage sought to
"prohibit discriminatory denial of service by entities holding themselves out as serving
everyone and possessing market power").
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power. 2 6 4 And while some traditional common carriers do not historically possess market power-such as trucking or aeronautics-the
NARUC test suggests that these industries became common carriers by
265
virtue of a strategic decision to serve the public indiscriminately.
Absent this voluntary act, the common law imposed common carrier-like obligations to control market power, and that rationale is
simply not present in the modem broadband industry.
Even if Crawford was correct, however, and broadband does
resemble the type of industry traditionally classified as a common carrier, the proposed net neutrality regulations would fail because they
impose a burden on the industry far greater than traditional common
carriage would. The essence of common carriage is that the carrier
266
It
must provide service to all comers at just and reasonable rates.
does not prevent the carrier from offering different services at different rates, as long as all similarly situated customers are offered similar
choices at similar prices. 26 7 For example, the U.S. Postal Service,
which is perhaps the quintessential common carrier, is permitted to
offer bulk-rate, first-class, priority-mail, and express-mail service to the
public, and to charge a higher price for faster delivery. By contrast,
the Commission has indicated that its "Open Internet" rules would
ban providers from offering faster delivery speeds for a price, even if
the "express mail" option is made available on a common carriage
basis to all content and application providers willing to pay the pre268
mium for such service.

264

See James F. Rill, The Evolution of Modern Antitrust Among Federal Agencies, 11
L. REV. 135, 137 (2002).

GEO. MASON

265 See NARUC, 525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
266 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2006) (describing the duty of a common carrier to
provide service at a reasonable rate); Munn, 94 U.S. at 126-28.
267 See supra note 266.
268 See Comments of AT&T Inc. at 131-32, Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 (FCC filedJan. 14, 2010), available at
http://www.att.com/comon/about-us/public-policy/AT&TNet Neutrality.commentsl_1409.pdf. As AT&T notes, the fact that common law common carriage
originates in the law of bailments only magnifies broadband providers' claims:

[U]nder the common law, a bailee assumes special duties to care for packages that need special care. Here, broadband providers seek the right to act as
bailees in this respect-to sell special packaging ([Quality of Service]

enhancements) to merchants (application or content providers) that wish to
contract for extra care in the delivery of their services to recipients. And the
Commission's proposed line-of-business restriction would paradoxically bar
them from doing so.
Id. at 132.
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None of this is to suggest that Congress is without the power to
impose common carriage-like restrictions on broadband providers as
a matter of policy. As noted above, Congress retains the power to
place whatever restrictions on broadband providers that it deems in
the public interest. But the Commission's proposed initiative cannot
be insulated from the Fifth Amendment with reference to traditional
common carriage principles. Broadband providers simply do not fit
the profile of a traditional common carrier, and the net neutrality
rules proposed in the "Open Internet" Initiative go far beyond traditional common carriage restrictions on business. As a result, the rules
do more than simply make explicit an existing restriction implied in
law on broadband providers' rights. Rather, they go further than
traditional common law common carriage ever would, and are not
shielded from a takings claim by the common law of common
carriage.
2.

Public Accommodations Rules

The proposed rules also impose a greater burden on broadband
providers than common law public accommodations statutes would
suggest. Though often opaque in its reasoning, the Court has sustained certain public accommodations statutes against takings claims.
The two leading cases on this point are Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States,269 which perfunctorily dismissed a Fifth Amendment
challenge to the Civil Rights Act, 270 and PruneYard Shopping Center v.

Robins, 2 71 which found that the California Constitution's grant of a
free speech right of access to shopping malls did not offend the Takings Clause. 2 72 The upshot of these decisions appears to be that property owners who invite the public generally to their property lose at
least some of their Fifth Amendment protections against further regulation of the right to access. 27 3 In a sense, this line of cases echoes the
common carriage restrictions placed upon entities that hold themselves out to serve the public indiscriminately.
But while these cases suggest that some form of public access
right is permissible, they are distinguishable from the Commission's
proposed net neutrality regulations in at least two ways. First, net neutrality reaches beyond the access rights of end-user consumers. The
Civil Rights Act and the state constitutional right in PruneYard hold
269 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
270 Id. at 258.
271 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
272 Id. at 81-82.
273 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
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simply that if, as an owner, you invite consumers generally to use your
property, you must do so in a nondiscriminatory manner. 274 But the
"Open Internet" Initiative is only indirectly concerned with end-user
consumers. As Philip Weiser has noted, all sides of the debate agree
that broadband providers can discriminate among end-user consumers, at least in the sense of charging consumers different prices for
different download and upload speeds. 2 75 Rather, net neutrality is
concerned about the relationship between broadband providers and
content and application providers-the "manufacturers" in the
Internet economy who produce the goods that consumers seek.
To use an offline comparison, net neutrality is akin to requiring
Costco to carry any and all merchandise that any vendor wishes to sell
in the store. Furthermore, the store would not be allowed to charge
for premium shelf space or other product placement, as is common in
the retail sector. Costco could earn revenue only from its annual
membership fees charged to shoppers, and from the sale of privatelabel merchandise in the store, but it is under strict rules that preclude it from dedicating more or better shelf space to its own privatelabel merchandise than that of its competitors. From this revenue it
must manage the store and pay all overhead expenses, in a manner
that does not threaten the ability of other vendors to sell their goods
at the store.
Put in this perspective, one quickly sees how net neutrality differs
in magnitude and in kind from traditional public accommodations
laws. Heart of Atlanta and PruneYard did not involve vendor access to
retail establishments; they simply held that once an establishment
opened its property to consumers, it could not discriminate against
particular classes of consumers on the basis of factors unrelated to the
operation of the establishment, such as a customer's race or political
views. 2 76 In other cases, the fact that a claimant's facilities are available for public use has not precluded the court from finding a taking
where the occupation is accomplished by an entity that is not an enduser consumer, or whose use does not lie within the scope of the public invitation.

277

Moreover, the public accommodations cases are distinguishable
because of the retained authority of the property owner to control the
274

See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82-83.
See ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 60, at 4 n.9.
276 See supra notes 269-274 and accompanying text.
277 See, e.g., Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the fact that consumers generally use power company's network to
receive electricity does not preclude takings claim based on statute granting cable
companies access to power company utility poles to install cable lines).
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conditions under which the public accesses the property. In
PruneYard, the Court refused to find a taking, in part, because the
mall owner could still "adopt[ ] time, place, and manner regulations
278
that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions."
Because of this retained control over the terms of access, the Court
explained that "the fact that they may have 'physically invaded' appellants' property cannot be viewed as determinative." 2 79 The Loretto
Court distinguished PruneYard on precisely this basis, noting that
PruneYardwas not a physical taking because of the restrictions that the
mall owner could place on protesters to "minimize interference with
the owner's commercial functions."

28 0

But of course, the net neutrality restrictions do not permit broadband owners a comparable level of retained control over the terms of
third-party access. Indeed, the very purpose of net neutrality is to
deny network owners the ability to place "time, place, and manner
restrictions [that would] minimize [any] interference with [its] commercial functions." 281 The purpose, rather, is precisely to interfere
with the owners' commercial functions, at least insofar as those commercial functions include charging for access to end-users or delivering bandwidth-intensive applications to end-users over congested
networks. 282 As a result, the breadth of the proposed net neutrality
rules likely takes it outside the scope of the public accommodations
laws held to be permissible under Heart of Atlanta and PruneYard.
III.

RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE "OPEN INTERNET" INITIATIVE AND THE

"THIRD WAY" PROPOSAL

Broadband providers thus have a strong argument that the Commission's proposed net neutrality rules effect a physical taking under
Loretto. The physical invasion of an electronic network by a third-party
signal is legally and physically no different from the invasion of a rooftop by equipment, 2 83 utility poles by foreign equipment, 28 4 or a beach-

front lot by tourists. 285 Each involves strangers receiving an
unfettered right of access to a defined area of private property over
the objection of the property owner, in a way that infringes upon the
owner's ability to exclude from, use, or dispose of the space so occu278 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
279 Id. at 84.
280 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982).

281 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 86-94.
282 See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
283
284

See supra text accompanying notes 134-50.
See supra text accompanying note 179.

285 See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
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pied. Of course, as Cablevision notes, courts may have some conceptual difficulty extending the Loretto doctrine to electronic networks,
despite the fact that the same property rights are at stake in both scenarios. 286 In that circumstance, broadband networks may fall back on
a more general regulatory takings claim under Penn Central,which is
arguable, but not as strong under existing case law.
But broadband providers need not have an airtight Takings
Clause claim before they can impact the present net neutrality debate.
The fact that the proposed rules present a "serious constitutional
question" suggests that the Commission should reconsider its decision
to promulgate net neutrality restrictions without a clear mandate from
Congress. The deference normally afforded to administrative action
under Chevron USA, Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. 2 8 7 is
inapplicable where the administrative action raises serious constitutional issues. 28 8 The Supreme Court has explained:

Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the
outer limits of Congress's power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended that result. This requirement stems from our
prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and
our assumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congres289
sional authority.
The canon of constitutional avoidance carries particular importance in the context of the Takings Clause, where a successful claim
would require the payment ofjust compensation and thus would raise
separation-of-powers concerns. In Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v.
FCC,290 the D.C. Circuit explained that "[w]here administrative interpretation of a statute creates such a class, use of a narrowing construction prevents executive encroachment on Congress's exclusive powers
to raise revenue and to appropriate funds." 291 The court explained
that without this limiting principle, "Chevron deference to agency
action that creates a broad class of takings claims, compensable in the
286 Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2009).
287 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984).
288 See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
289 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172-73 (2001) (citation omitted); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001)

("[W]hen a particular interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result."); Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 851 (2000) ("[C]onstitutionally doubtful constructions
should be avoided where possible.").
290 24 F.3d 1441.

291

Id. at 1445.
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Court of Claims, would allow agencies to use statutory silence or ambiguity to expose the Treasury to liability both massive and unforeseen."2 9 2 Bell Atlantic involved a Fifth Amendment challenge to an
FCC access rule, promulgated without clear authorization from Congress, that required local telephone companies to grant competitors
access to their networks. The D.C. Circuit did not resolve the Fifth
Amendment claim, because it did not need to do so; rather, it found
that because the petitioners' claim "fairly implicates" the Takings
Clause under Loretto, and the Commission lacked express authority
293
from Congress to mandate access, the rule was held to be invalid.
Here, it is important to note that Congress has not clearly authorized the Commission to impose net neutrality rules on broadband
providers. If anything, the fact that Congress has considered, but
failed to pass, a series of net neutrality bills since 2005 (most recently,
a bill co-sponsored by then-Senators Clinton and Obama during the
2008 presidential election) suggests that Congress is, at best, unconcerned about, and, at worst, hostile to, such a proposal.2 9 4 Perhaps
more telling, several Senators and a majority of House members from
both parties have written letters to the Commission opposing Chair295
man Genachowski's "Third Way" proposal.
292 Id.
293 See id. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), the
Supreme Court held that "the possibility that the application of a regulatory program
may in some instances result in a taking of individual pieces of property is no justification for the use of narrowing constructions to curtail the program if compensation
will in any event be available in those cases where a taking has occurred." Id. at 128.
Because the Tucker Act allows affected owners to bring takings claims in the Court of
Federal Claims, just compensation is often available in the event of an inadvertent
taking that is the side effect of a regulation. See id.; see also Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n v.
United States, 987 F.2d 806, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1993). But Riverside Bayview made an
exception for agency decisions "where it appears that there is an identifiable class of
cases in which the application of a statute will necessarily or even probably constitute
a taking." Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 128 n.5 (citing United States v. Sec. Indus.
Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982)). Such situations squarely present the separation-of-powers
concerns addressed in Bell Atlantic and compel a narrowing construction, precisely to
prevent the agency from "expos(ing] the Treasury to liability both massive and
unforeseen." Bell Atlantic, 24 F.3d at 1445.
294 See, e.g., Debate Leaves FCC with No Defenders on Comcast-BitTorrent Order,TR DAILY
(Mar. 3, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 4453724 ("Former U.S. Solicitor General
Gregory Garre ....suggested that the FCC... ask[ ] Congress for explicit authority
to regulate Internet traffic management-which could prove difficult since previous
efforts by lawmakers to pass such regulation have failed ....").
295 See Reclassification, Net Neutrality Should Be Distinct, Pelosi Says, TELECOMM. REP.
(June 15, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 11841364 (noting letter sent by seventy-four
House Democrats and other letters signed by 137 House Republicans and thirty-seven
Republican Senators opposing reclassification plan).
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The cornerstone of the "Third Way" proposal is the reclassification of broadband Internet services as a "telecommunications service"
under Title II of the Communications Act, which the Commission
began exploring after the Comcast decision rejected its argument that
it could regulate broadband providers' network management practices under Title 1.296 But Congress wrote Tide II to govern the telephone industry. Fitting broadband service into this framework is
awkward, to say the least-as Chairman Genachowski freely admits,
most of Title II's requirements would be, at best, irrelevant, and, at
worst, affirmatively harmful, to the broadband industry. 29 7 To fit this
square peg into Title II's round hole, the Commission would use its
forbearance authority-a power given to promote competition in the
telephone industry-to carve from the statute a Title II-lite law of
broadband.
But the Takings Clause question complicates this already tricky
set of legal maneuvers. National Cable and Telecommunications Ass'n v.
Brand X Services298 held that it is ambiguous whether "telecommunications service" as used in Title II includes broadband service. 299 While
the Supreme Court deferred under Chevron to the Commission's classification of broadband service under Title I, it should not give the
same level of deference to a decision to reclassify the industry under
Title II. At the very least, this reclassification would implicate a "serious constitutional question" whether net neutrality constitutes either
a physical taking under Loretto or a regulatory taking under Penn Central,suggesting that Chevron deference would be inappropriate to such
a decision. Without explicit congressional authority to regulate
broadband providers, Bell Atlantic and other decisions suggest that
even the "Third Way" is unlikely to withstand judicial review.
CONCLUSION

At its core, net neutrality seeks to eliminate broadband providers'
rights to discriminate among third-party content providers that seek
to distribute material on their electronic networks. The policies implicated by such restrictions, and the effect upon the retained property
rights of network owners, are issues that directly implicate the Takings
Clause, because they extinguish broadband providers' right to
exclude and appropriate the use of such networks for the public.
Therefore the Court's physical takings jurisprudence should apply to
296
297
298
299

See Net Neutrality NPRM, supra note 2, at 62,649.
See Genachowski, supra note 118, at 4.
545 U.S. 967 (2005).
See id. at 989.
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electronic networks, and the Commission's effort to impose net neutrality rules effects a taking under this line of cases, which cannot be
accomplished without providing just compensation.
But a court reviewing the inevitable challenge to the Commission's proposed rules need not resolve whether net neutrality actually
effects a taking under Loretto or the more ad hoc Penn Central test. It
is sufficient to note that the issue presents a serious constitutional
question, which implicates the presumption "that Congress does not
casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to
push the limit of congressional authority."300 When coupled with the
ongoing dialogue regarding the First Amendment implications of the
proposed rule and the continuing skepticism expressed by the D.C.
Circuit and members of Congress regarding the Commission's authority, this presumption suggests that the Commission would be better
served to seek explicit congressional authority before carrying the net
neutrality project forward. A refusal to do so risks judicial invalidation
of Chairman Genachowski's "Open Internet" Initiative.

300 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172-73 (2001).

